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Introduction, motivation, and content 
The question of personal responsibility for health is increasingly discussed. As epidemiological 
research shows a number of diseases to be associated with particular lifestyle characteristics – 
most relevantly smoking, drinking, lack of exercise, and over-eating – it is obvious to raise 
questions on whether the individual, holding such lifestyle characteristics, is responsible for her 
higher risk of getting these diseases, and therefore, for instance, should be held responsible for 
the related health care costs. According to a recent Danish study, when asked about whether 
weight loss surgery should be financed by the public or the obese themselves, 46,5 % responded 
that weight loss surgery is to be financed by the obese themselves (20,3 % responded that they 
did not know). Most interestingly, however, 74,5 % of these respondents held the view that if 
there is evidence that the patient is not responsible for the obesity then they would change their 
mind about the former.1  
 
This study confirms an expectation of mine, namely that many people find personal responsibility 
central to distributive justice. Many people simply believe that if an individual herself is 
responsible for some unfortunate state of affairs then it somehow counts as a constraint on what 
society owes to that individual in terms of compensation – also when it comes to matters of health 
and health care.  
In this PhD-dissertation I consider the matter of personal responsibility because of its relevance to 
distributive justice. I aim to answer three focal questions: 
 
1) What role ought personal responsibility to play in distributive justice in health and health 
care?  
2) What does it take for an individual to be responsible for her own health condition (or 
responsible in general)?  
3) And what is the relation between responsibility and cost-responsibility?  
 
These are the questions this PhD-dissertation pertains to.    
                                                          
1
 Lund, TB, Sandøe, P, Lassen, J; “Attitudes to Publicly Funded Obesity Treatment and Prevention”; Obesity; 2011; 19; 8; 1580–1585.  





Not just many laypersons find personal responsibility central to distributive justice. Among 
contemporary political philosophers it is widely agreed that if an individual is worse off than 
others through no responsibility of her own, then that difference is arbitrary from a moral point of 
view. In particular, this observation is the kernel point in the theory of luck egalitarianism, which 
essentially states that it is unjust for an individual to be worse off than others due to no 
responsibility of her own.2 In a context of health (care) policy this is crucial since if an individual 
gets a disease for which she is responsible, say a lung cancer due to smoking, it may, for instance, 
imply that: 
 
She should be held responsible for the hospital-expenses related to surgery etc. of 
her disease.  
 
She escapes general political aims to reduce (social) inequality in health.  
 
Research in diseases that (typically) are caused by lifestyle should have lower priority 
than diseases that are not caused by lifestyle. 
 
These potential implications may seem frightening to many, and we may therefore ask whether 
distributive justice in health and health care ought to be sensitive to responsibility at all? 
Prominent contemporary political philosophers from the Rawlsian tradition, such as Norman 
Daniels and Elisabeth Anderson, argue that we should not.3 One central reason for this is exactly 
                                                          
2
 See: Cohen, GA; “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”; Ethics; 1989; 99, no. 4; p. 906-44. And: Knight, C; Luck Egalitarianism: 
Equality, Responsibility, and Justice; Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press; 2009. And: Arneson, RJ; “Equality and Equal 
Opportunity for Welfare”; in: L.P. Pojman and R.B. Westmoreland (eds.); Equality: Selected Readings; Oxford; Oxford University 
Press; 1997; p. 229-41. 
3
 Anderson, E; “What is the point of equality?”; Ethics; 1999; 109; p. 287-337. And: Daniels, N; Just Health: Meeting Health Needs 
Fairly; New York; Cambridge University Press; 2008. 
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the potential conflict between responsibility and the ideal of free and equal access to health care, 
which is roughly illustrated in Anderson’s abandonment objection: 
Consider an uninsured driver who negligently makes an illegal turn that causes an 
accident with another car. Witnesses call the police, reporting who is at fault; the 
police transmit this information to emergency medical technicians. When they arrive 
at the scene and find that the driver at fault is uninsured, they leave him to die by 
the side of the road.4 
We should note, however, that this objection and my listed potential implications may not be as 
frightening as they first seem to be. First, holding individuals responsible for the costs of diseases 
they themselves are responsible for (or partly responsible for) may be done ex ante rather than ex 
post. This means, for example, that when a smoker ends up in a hospital with, say, lung cancer, 
then she and her fellow smokers have already paid for the treatment through taxes imposed on 
each single pack of tobacco. It therefore seems possible never to abandon the imprudent, and yet 
pass on the costs of imprudent behaviour to the imprudent individuals themselves. Second, we 
should note that even a plausible theory of distributive justice may not speak decisively about 
what a society ought to do, all things considered. For instance, Shlomi Segall, whose writings are 
essential to this dissertation, defends luck egalitarianism in a health context, and argues that we 
do not have justice-based reasons to provide health care to individuals who fall ill due to their own 
responsibility, but that we have other moral reasons to do so, nonetheless, namely reasons of 
meeting basic needs.5  
 
Third, if responsibility matters, then I find it difficult to see why it should not matter in a health 
context:  
   
Imagine two boys, who in the age of 18 have the exact same natural skills and the 
exact same social background. After high school one of them chooses (fully 
informed) to spend his youth travelling around in the Far East. The other chooses 
                                                          
4
 Anderson; 1999; ibid; p. 295. 
5
 Segall, S; Health, Luck, and Justice; Princeton; Princeton University Press; 2010; p. 64.
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(fully informed) to go to business school. Afterwards he gets a well-paid job in a 
bank. Ten years after they meet for coffee. Is it difficult to follow the former if he 
complains about the income-inequality between the two in reference to justice?6 If 
so, then I do not see any morally relevant difference between this case and the 
following:  
Imagine two boys who in the age of 18 have the exact same natural skills, social 
background, and genetic disposition for all relevant diseases. After high school one of 
them adopts (fully informed) a Rock’n’Roll-lifestyle: He hangs around in bars, drinks a 
lot of alcohol, smokes many cigarettes, and eats fatty junk food, when he wakes up 
in the afternoon. The other chooses (fully informed) to eat healthy food, not to 
smoke, a lot of exercise, and only rarely to drink alcohol. When they meet many 
years later would it not be, at least similarly, difficult to follow the former if he 
complains about the health-inequality between the two in reference to justice?  
Therefore, if responsibility matters (ultimately), I fail to see why it should not matter in a health 
context, ceteris paribus.    
Procedure and content of the dissertation   
The dissertation consists primarily in the following four articles:  
1) “Social inequality in health, responsibility, and egalitarian justice” 
2) “Reasonable avoidability, responsibility, and lifestyle diseases” 
3) “Obesity and personal responsibility” 
4) “What does society owe me if I am worse off due to my own responsibility?” 
I will first briefly explain the content of each of these articles and how they aim to answer my 
three focal questions. Secondly, I will proceed by offering some general comments and 
clarifications. This pertains a) to the phenomenon of social inequality in health, and very briefly 
how it is explained, b) to some fundamental disagreements about (luck) egalitarianism (or 
                                                          
6
 This example is a slightly modified loan from Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen. See Lippert-Rasmussen, K; ”Lige muligheder og ansvar”; 
in Holtug, N. and Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (eds.); Lige muligheder for alle; Frederiksberg; Nyt for Samfundsvidenskaberne; 2009. 
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distributive principles more broadly), and how my articles relate to these, and c) to 
responsibilization in health politics, which regards reasons to hold individuals cost-responsible in 
different ways for certain behaviours apart from considerations about whether they in fact are 
responsible for these certain behaviours. Thirdly, I offer a section on my methodology, and 
fourthly I bring in the four articles.     
Presentation of the articles 
Recall the three focal questions I aim to answer:  
1) What role ought personal responsibility to play in distributive justice in health and health 
care?  
2) What does it take for an individual to be responsible for her own health condition (or 
responsible in general)?  
3) And what is the relation between responsibility and cost-responsibility?  
 
In my first article – “Social inequality in health, responsibility, and egalitarian justice” – I, and 
several co-writers, bring recent political philosophical discussions of responsibility in egalitarian 
and luck egalitarian theory to bear on issues of social inequality in health and access to health 
care. The article focuses on focal question 1 and 2:   
There is substantive inequality in health between different socio-economic groups in all societies. 
Roughly speaking, lower morbidity and mortality increase proportionally with higher income and 
education. However, a considerable part of social inequality in health can be explained by 
differences in lifestyle, and if lifestyle is something the individual herself is responsible for then the 
health inequalities that stem from lifestyles are not in tension with luck egalitarianism. As luck 
egalitarianism also implies that individuals, who fall ill due to lifestyle for which they are 
responsible, do not have a justice-based right to health care, many philosophers deny the 
plausibility of luck egalitarianism and favour instead theories of distributive justice, which are 
insensitive to responsibility (at least regarding access to health care). But these theories, however 
strong they might be, are rather avoiding the question of responsibility than answering it. If 
individuals are responsible for lifestyle choices, which lead to increased risks of certain diseases, 
then we can hold them cost-responsible, via a system of ex ante taxation, without therefore 
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abandoning them. Pertaining to my first focal question, we therefore argue that the abandonment 
objection is not a decisive reason to avoid sensitivity to responsibility in matters of health and 
health care. 
However, it is far from obvious that we are ever responsible for anything, including lifestyle 
choices, which lead to increased risks of various diseases. Pertaining to my second focal question, 
we suggest – but do not fully establish – that at the most fundamental level people are never 
responsible in such a way that appeals to individuals’ own responsibility can justify inequalities in 
health. If this is so, then following the luck egalitarian principle – that it is unjust for an individual 
to be worse off than others through no responsibility of her own – we are able not only to explain 
why we should give free and equal health care access to individuals affected by diseases for which 
lifestyle choices are a risk factor, but also why we have justice-based reasons to reduce social 
inequality in health.  
In my second article – “Reasonable avoidability, responsibility, and lifestyle diseases” – I 
investigate and object to some arguments put forward by Shlomi Segall, who in his book Health, 
Luck, and Justice defends a luck egalitarian approach to justice in health care. The article concerns 
the question of how to understand the notion of responsibility in luck egalitarian theory, and 
therefore touches on both my first and my second focal question.  
Segall suggests that the notion of responsibility should be replaced with a principle of Reasonable 
Avoidability so that the luck egalitarian principle states that:”It is unjust for individuals to be worse 
off than others due to outcomes that it would have been unreasonable to expect them to avoid.”7 
He takes this to imply that we do not have justice-based reasons to treat diseases brought about 
by imprudent behaviour such as smoking and over-eating. While I seek to investigate how more 
precisely we are to understand this principle of Reasonable Avoidability, I also object to it. First, I 
argue that Segall neither succeeds in showing that individuals quite generally are responsible for 
behaviours such as smoking and over-eating, nor that responsibility is ultimately irrelevant for the 
principle of Reasonable Avoidability. Second, I object to an argument of his, according to which 
the size of the health-care costs related to smoking and obesity is irrelevant for whether society 
reasonably can expect individuals to avoid smoking and obesity. Finally, I come up with a 
                                                          
7
 Segall, S; 2010; ibid.; p. 13 
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suggestion as for how to modify the principle of Reasonable Avoidability: For something to be 
reasonably avoidable, say smoking, 3 conditions must be satisfied: 1) individuals in general must 
be responsible for smoking, 2) smoking must lead to higher costs than non-smoking, and 3) we 
cannot have other relevant societal reasons not to find smoking reasonably avoidable.  
In my third article – “Obesity and personal responsibility” – I, and my colleague Morten Ebbe Juul 
Nielsen, ask what it fundamentally takes for an individual to be responsible for overweight or 
obesity? Specifically it therefore pertains to my second focal question:   
Morten and I examine what in the philosophical tradition appear to be the three basic approaches 
to responsibility: First what we call a naturalistic approach, secondly a true identity approach, and 
last a reason-responsiveness approach. These are different fundamental theories of what 
responsibility ultimately requires, and they are basic in the sense that they are generic and form 
the kernel of the philosophical discussion of responsibility. To illustrate the implications of each of 
them we introduce a made-up obese test person, Sam, who eats too many high fat cakes. We 
show what it takes, according to each of these theories, for Sam to be responsible for being obese. 
We show that only one of them – what we call the naturalistic approach – can justify the 
widespread intuition that much causal influence on obesity, such as genetics and social 
circumstances, diminishes or even completely undermines personal responsibility. However, 
accepting the naturalistic approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible, since it 
depends on the truth of agent-causality, which is the view that individuals (agents) are able to 
start new causal chains that are neither pre-determined, nor completely random. We argue that 
agent-causality is implausible, and that we therefore need either to reject some widely shared 
general intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or -undermining, or accept that 
there is no personal responsibility – neither for overweight and obesity. However, as we also note 
some outstanding difficulties with both the true identity- and the reason-responsiveness approach, 
we argue that the best explanation actually is that responsibility is impossible. Finally, we briefly 
elaborate on the political implications of the latter.  
Even though I thus deny the possibility of responsibility, I nevertheless proceed under the 
assumption that responsibility is possible. This is for two reasons: 1) I may be wrong, and 2) even if 
I am not wrong then it does not follow that I therefore can convince everyone. In my fourth article 
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– “What does society owe me if I am worse off due to my own responsibility?” – I therefore 
address the relation between responsibility and cost-responsibility, and I thereby answer my third 
focal question: 
The principle of luck egalitarianism – that it is unjust for an individual to be worse off than others 
due to no responsibility of her own – does not tell us much regarding the fate of the individual, 
who is worse off than others due to her own responsibility. Suppose, for instance, smokers are 
responsible for smoking and a smoker gets lung cancer (partly) because of her smoking. Does the 
principle imply that society owes her absolutely no compensation for surgery expenses? Or is 
there more to the question, for instance because smoking is not the only cause of her lung cancer? 
In other words: The luck egalitarian literature offers many sophisticated discussions on how to 
understand the notion of responsibility, choice or option luck, and thus when more precisely it is 
(or is not) unjust for an individual to be worse off than others. But it does not offer any answer to 
the question of what more precisely the self-responsible worse off individual ought to be held 
cost-responsible for. I therefore discuss two parallel questions: 1) if an individual is worse off than 
others due to her own responsibility then what benefits, if any, does society have justice-based 
reasons to provide her? But if there are benefits which society does not have justice-based 
reasons to provide her, in terms of e.g. coverage of surgery expenses, then who should cover 
them? Her? Or her and other individuals behaving in the same way, e.g. other smokers? 
Therefore: 2) if an individual is worse off than others due to her own responsibility then what 
benefits, if any, does society have justice-based reasons to hold that individual (uniquely) cost-
responsible for? I come up with different suggestions to this question, but argue, ultimately, for 
the following: For each self-responsible worse off individual we need to compare 1) the 
(hypothetical) cost of the universalization of her behaviour, that is if everyone (in our moral scope) 
did as she did, and 2) the (hypothetical) cost of the universalization of prudence, that is if 
everyone did not self-responsibly behave in any health-damaging ways. If the cost in the former 
case is higher than in the latter, then what society does not have justice-based reasons to cover, 
and to hold that individual (uniquely) cost-responsible for is the difference between 1 and 2 
divided by the number of individuals that are part of the universalisation. 
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These articles are the main content of the dissertation. But before I bring them in, I will first offer a 
section of general comments and clarifications, and then, second, a section on my methodology. 
The general comments and clarifications, which I will offer now, pertains a) to the phenomenon of 
social inequality in health, and very briefly how it is explained, b) to some fundamental 
disagreements about (luck) egalitarianism (or distributive principles more broadly), and how my 
articles relate to these, and c) to responsibilization in health politics, which regards reasons to hold 
individuals cost-responsible in different ways for certain behaviours, apart from considerations 
about whether they in fact are responsible for these certain behaviours. I find it appropriate, and 
hopefully useful to the reader, to consider these questions here, and explain how my findings 
relate to them. Also, by doing so I get the opportunity to add some comments and observations, 
which the reader might find missing in the articles. 
Health, personal responsibility, and distributive justice. PhD dissertation. Martin Marchman Andersen. 
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General comments and clarification 
Social inequality in health  
Social inequalities in health have been reported since the early stages of the industrialization of 
western societies.8 Although medical science has improved enormously over the latest centuries, 
and though European societies have had health policies since the 1930s, the inequalities have not 
been equalized.9 In fact, health is still standing as one of the largest indicators of social inequalities 
in modern societies. Roughly speaking, lower morbidity and mortality increase proportionally with 
higher income and education. To wit:  
 
Life expectancy for men in England and Wales from 1992-1996 was for respectively 
social class 1 and social class 5 approx. 78 and approx. 68 years.10  
 
However, it is not just that the poor dies earlier than the rich. Rather, for every step up the socio-
economic scale morbidity and mortality decrease. A Swedish study shows that people who hold a 
BA degree have higher mortality than people who hold a Master degree, who again have higher 
mortality than people who hold a PhD degree.11  
 
Even though social inequality in health is an uncontroversial fact, the details are numerous and the 
questions of explanation are still subject to disagreement. Three types of explanations of social 
inequalities in health have originally been given. These are: (1) natural or social selection, (2) the 
materialist explanation, and (3) the cultural or behavioural explanation. On many occasions, 
however, these are not mutually exclusive.  
 
                                                          
8
 Siegrist, J. and Marmot, M. (eds.); Social Inequalities in Health; Oxford University Press; 2006; p. 1. 
9
 Leon, D and Watt, G; Inequality and Health; Oxford University Press; 2001. 
10
 Drever, F. and Whitehead, M; Health Inequalities: Decennial Supplement; Series DS No. 15; 1-257; London; The Stationery Office, 
Office for National Statistics; 1997.  
11
 Erikson, R; “Why Do Graduates Live Longer?”; In Jonsson, JO. and Mills, C. (eds.);  Cradle to Grave: Life-course Change in Modern 
Sweden; Durham; Sociology Press; 2001.   
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Natural or social selection claims that the focus should be turned around so that health 
determines social position.  
 
The materialist (or structuralist) explanation states that when the distribution of material goods 
is unequal the disadvantaged groups will have lesser opportunities to avoid distressing work and 
unhealthy housing.  
 
The cultural or behavioural explanation states that cultural influences shape health-damaging 
and health-promoting behaviour through processes of socialization that are socially graded. 
Smoking, lack of exercise and fatty food are more common in groups of lower socio-economic 
status, and as these behavioural features are well-documented causes of different kinds of cancer 
and cardiovascular diseases, and therefore lower survival rates, the explanation seems largely 
plausible. However, in most studies an unexplained social gradient remains even after adjustments 
have been made for behavioural risk factors.12 
 
These explanations, however, are not exhaustive. Also psychosocial circumstances are suggested 
to have an (unequal) impact on morbidity and mortality of different social groups. In one of the 
various Whitehall studies, based on London offices of the British civil service, it was found that 
even if individuals of the highest employment grade (administrators) and individuals of the lowest 
employment grade (other) smoked the same number of cigarettes, it is three times more likely 
that individuals of the latter get lung cancer than individuals of the former.13 A further hypothesis 
therefore goes on differential vulnerability such that if an individual is exposed to more risk 
factors, these factors have an impact on each other, such that each single risk factor increases.  
Even though it is a controversial matter how much of the existing social inequality in health the 
behavioural explanation actually can explain – depending on whether we measure absolute or 
                                                          
12
 Siegrist, J. and Marmot, M. (eds.); 2006; ibid.  
13
 Marmot, M. et al.; “Inequalities in Death – Specific Explanations of a General Pattern?”; Lancet 1; 1984; no. 8384; p. 1003-1006. 
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relative inequality suggestions range from approx. 70-80%14 to approx. 33%15 – this is the relevant 
explanation in this dissertation. This is because it most obviously gives rise to the claim that the 
social differences in health are indirect results of individual choices in the disadvantaged groups. It 
gives rise to the claim that the worse off individuals themselves are responsible for being worse 
off to the extent this explanation is true, and that claim is very much what this dissertation is 
about.  
  
Equality of what, how, when, and between whom?  
Everyone who addresses egalitarianism, or distributive principles more broadly, needs ultimately 
to consider (at least) the following five questions. 1) Is it inequality between individuals or groups 
that is unjust? 2) Does it matter how a certain outcome, e.g. inequality, is brought about? In the 
case of health distribution, this may be whether a certain deviation is brought about by natural or 
social causes. 3) What is it ultimately that we ought to distribute? What is our currency? 4) What 
pattern of distribution ought we to apply? E.g. egalitarianism or utilitarianism? And finally 5) 
within what time-span ought we to consider 1-4? Even though I primarily insist on addressing the 
matter of responsibility, I find it appropriate, and hopefully useful to the reader, to consider these 
questions here, and explain how my findings relate to them. Also, doing so gives me the 
opportunity to add some comments and observations, which the reader might find missing in my 
articles. From the top: 
1: Social inequality in health is the fact that different socio-economic groups enjoy different levels 
of health. An instance of social inequality in health is that the group of individuals holding a PhD 
degree has lower mortality than the group of individuals holding a BA degree.16 Suppose social 
inequality in health is unjust, and that this inequality therefore is unjust. Then some may hold that 
what is unjust is that one group is better off, health-wise and education-wise, than another 
                                                          
14
 Lynch, JW. et al.; “Explaining the social gradient in coronary heart disease: comparing relative and absolute approaches”; Journal 
of Epidemiology and Community Health; 2006; 60; p. 435–441.  
15
 Marmot, M; The Status Syndrome; New York; Times Books; 2004; p. 45. 
16
 Erikson, R; 2001; ibid.  
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group.17 I disagree. Consider the following two groups, A and B, representing respectively the 
groups of individuals holding a PhD and the group of individuals holding af BA. Each group consists 
of three individuals with different ages at their day of death: 
A:  I1: 60  I2: 60  I3: 120 Average: 80 
B:  I4: 70 I5: 70 I6: 70 Average: 70 
Now, why should we, morally speaking, focus on groups? Social inequality in health is a two-point 
measurement. Even though all individuals in A are better off education-wise than all individuals in 
B, most individuals in B are better off health-wise than most individuals in A. Now, I do not mean 
to suggest that these numbers are statistically representative of the real world, but I do mean to 
suggest that if inequality is unjust, then it is inequality between individuals, not groups, that is 
unjust.  Thus, even though I do not fully establish why, I hold, in line with both a general liberal and 
luck egalitarian tradition, that if inequality (or some other distributional state of affairs) is unjust, it 
is inequality between individuals that is unjust.18 However, for at least two reasons, this does not 
mean that we should ignore measurements of group inequalities, including social inequality in 
health.  
First, the fact that individuals from lower socio-economic groups statistically are worse off health-
wise than individuals from higher socio-economic groups gives us, under the (often plausible) 
assumption that there is no (or very little) significant genetic difference between large (number) 
groups, reason to believe that much health inequality is caused by social factors, i.e. the way we 
organize the society. There are simply instrumental scientific reasons to study group inequalities. 
By doing so we gain useful knowledge whether we wish to reduce health inequalities, or just, e.g., 
maximise health.  
                                                          
17
 For instance, Rawls holds that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the 
least-advantaged group. See: Rawls, J; A Theory of Justice; Oxford; Oxford University Press; 1971; p. 95-100. 
18
 For further introduction to this question see Holtug, N. and Lippert-Rasmussen, K.; “An Introduction to Contemporary 
Egalitarianism”; In: Holtug, N. and Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (eds.); Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality; 
Oxford University Press; 2007. 
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Second, if this is so, then it also gives us reason to believe that much of the health inequality 
between individuals is caused by social circumstances rather than choices, which is of paramount 
importance in order to determine whether this inequality is unjust, ceteris paribus, according to 
luck egalitarian theory. This is in particular so regarding (much of) the social inequality in health 
that remains after adjusting for well-known individual risk-factors, such as smoking and eating- 
and exercising habits, but also, though with less certainty, regarding the social inequality that 
actually stems from differences in ‘exposure’ to such well-known individual risk-factors. This is for 
the following reason: If we have two large (number) groups exposed to very different socio-
economic circumstances, and we know that the choice of e.g. smoking is much more common in 
one of these groups than in the other, then we also have reason to believe that the difference in 
socio-economic circumstances can causally explain the difference in the smoking frequency 
between the two groups. The alternative would be either to hold that the difference in smoking-
frequency between the groups is an expression of differences in individuals’ free choices, or that it 
is a pure coincidence. But both these alternatives seem unsatisfactory when we have large 
numbers. Therefore, insofar we hold an understanding of responsibility that implies that external 
causal influences count as responsibility-softening, we also have reason to believe that smoking is 
not just a matter of individuals’ own responsibility.19          
2: A very influential article in the literature of inequality in health is ‘The concepts and principles of 
equity and health’ written by Margaret Whitehead.20 Whitehead suggests that health inequalities 
that stem from natural, biological variations should not be considered as inequities, i.e. unjust. 
Behind this suggestion is a widespread intuition that social inequality in health is unjust because 
(or to the extent that) it is caused by social factors, i.e. the way we organize society. In opposition 
to this, I, in line with the luck egalitarian literature21, consider such distinction to be morally 
arbitrary. Consider the following case:   
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John is in his late thirties and Brian is in his late sixties. They both live healthy without 
tobacco, too much alcohol, and fatty food. Now John gets diagnosed with colon 
cancer, and Brian gets diagnosed with lung cancer. In their respective diagnoses it 
appears that John’s colon cancer most likely has genetic causes, while Brian’s lung 
cancer most likely is caused by many years of exposure to asbestos (a work 
circumstance which Brian was not aware about). Both diseases can be cured if 
surgery will be made immediately. However, at the hospital, unfortunately, there is 
only one physician, and as both surgeries are demanding, and need to be done 
immediately, she cannot give surgery to both John and Brian. Who ought she to give 
it to?    
Now if socially caused inequality in health is unjust, while inequality in health that stems from 
natural or biological variation is not, then justice suggests that she should give surgery to Brian. 
This, however, is extremely counter-intuitive, or so I maintain. Brian already lived for approx. 30 
years longer than John. Whitehead, of course, may hold that we have other reasons to give the 
surgery to John, for instance reasons of efficiency in terms of more expected life years due to their 
age difference. Still, however, this is what justice, according to her proposal, suggests us to do. But 
I fail to see why this is just, and therefore why we for justice-based should give the surgery to 
Brian. Therefore I hold, accordingly, that the distinction between socially and naturally caused 
inequalities in health is morally arbitrary.       
3: (Luck) egalitarians have come up with different suggestions as to what it is that people should 
have equal shares of. The general suggestions are welfare, resources and capabilities22, and they 
all seem to imply that we should be concerned about the distribution of health, either as a means 
to welfare, one resource among others, or as a capability. Even more, they all seem to imply that 
we should be concerned about social inequality in health. This is because those who are worse off 
health-wise, statistically, also are those who are worse off socio-economically speaking. However, 
some philosophers also hold that health is special. Norman Daniels, for instance, argues, roughly, 
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that health has strategic importance in our lives because health has fundamental affect on our 
ability to pursue and realize life plans.23 This involves that the distribution of health and health 
care is not fully compatible with the distribution of other resources. Health is somehow special. In 
my fourth article in this dissertation I ultimately translate my findings regarding health-related 
cost-responsibility to a currency of welfare. This is because many luck egalitarians hold welfare to 
be our currency, and so do I. However, I do not argue for this position, and my findings, I believe, 
are compatible with each of these four takes on the question.      
4: A not less fundamental question regards what distributional pattern we ought to follow. As 
much of this dissertation is framed in a context of luck egalitarianism, I also generally frame my 
arguments as if equality (with responsibility as a constraint) is our distributional pattern. 
Egalitarianism, however, is fragile, since its’ advocates in one respect, namely in respect of 
equality, is forced to favour an even outcome, between e.g. two individuals, say 10, 10, over an 
unequal outcome where everyone is better of, say 50, 60. But no rational person would favour the 
first outcome over the latter, all things considered. A more plausible version of egalitarianism 
therefore needs to go hand in hand with some additional concern for efficiency. Therefore, when 
most of what I write in the articles in this dissertation is framed in a context of luck egalitarianism, 
it is for reasons of simplicity, more than because equality is a position I wish to defend. Rather, I 
wish to stay silent on the question of what general distributional principle we ought to apply. 
What I write regards primarily the matter of responsibility as a constraint on our distributive 
principle, whether this principle otherwise is egalitarian, prioritarian24, sufficientarian25, or even 
utilitarian. Thus, the principle I ultimately would like to follow is that it is unjust for an individual to 
be worse off than she ought to be, according to a responsibility-insensitive version of the correct 
distributional principle, through no responsibility of her own. In other words we may add the 
‘luck’-component in luck egalitarianism to other distributional principles, getting luck 
prioritarianism, luck sufficientarianism, and even luck utilitarianism. Much of my writing, though, 
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for technical reasons, perhaps not everything, should be compatible with these different 
principles.       
5: A fifth fundamental distributional question regards time.26 If e.g. equality is our distributional 
principle, then we need to know within what time-span equality ought to be obtained. There are 
different suggestions to this question. The most promising answer (in my view) is that of equality 
of lifetime advantage, which is satisfied between two individuals if they at the end of their lives 
have (had) equal shares of the relevant distributional currency.27 However, I do not defend this 
view, and my findings, I believe, are compatible with different takes on this question.      
Responsibilization 
Before I move on to the question of methodology, I would like to add some comments about 
responsibilization. This regards reasons to hold individuals responsible in different ways for certain 
behaviours, apart from considerations about whether they in fact are responsible for these certain 
behaviours. When considering whether we ought to hold individuals responsible for X, the 
question of whether individuals are responsible for X is namely only one concern. To put it 
differently, we may have reasons to hold individuals responsible for X, even if they are not 
responsible for X. We may namely have reasons of efficiency to hold individuals responsible. I 
comment slightly on such reasons in some of my articles, but only slightly, so I would like to 
address them here. This is because they pose a necessary part in an all things considered-analysis 
of whether we ought to tax different unhealthy products or behaviours, but also because I believe 
it is important to keep these considerations in mind in order to isolate them from specific 
considerations about responsibility. 
     
To illustrate our potential efficiency-based reasons to hold individuals responsible, let us begin at 
some more personal level. Suppose responsibility is ultimately impossible, such as I suggest it in 
article 1 and 3, and that a person, call her Sam, complains about her overweight at some get-
together over coffee whereupon she stretches out for her third piece of cake. Ignoring reasons of 
politeness, nothing seems more obvious than to ask her: why don’t you just leave it? But in 
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considering whether we ought to ask her so, we should, if responsibility is impossible, remember 
that she is not responsible for eating the third piece of cake. But it does not follow that we 
therefore should not somehow hold her responsible, e.g. in terms of blame or restrictions. For 
instance, to the extent we have reasons to believe the chances of a change (for the better) in her 
eating-behaviour will increase if we blame her, we ought to blame her – ceteris paribus. Similarly, 
if we have reason to believe she will change behaviour if we encourage her, or otherwise praise 
her, then we have reason to do that – ceteris paribus. Whether individuals are responsible for 
behaviours leading to increased risks of diseases is thus only one concern in determining whether 
we ought to hold them responsible. Other concerns regards what we have reason to believe will 
be the consequences of holding them responsible in different ways, which to a large degree is a 
matter of empirical questions. I will consider whether holding individuals cost-responsible in 
different ways is a way to improve health (or ultimately welfare) outcomes. When doing so, it is 
appropriate to begin in insurance theory where we recognize the notion of moral hazard.    
 
Moral hazard and ex post cost-responsibility 
The notion of moral hazard  is the hypothesis that (here framed in a health context) individuals 
tend to have a higher tendency to gamble with their health insofar they know the bill from their 
health care services is completely covered by the health care system. If this hypothesis is true it 
counts as one prima facie reason to hold individuals ex post cost-responsible for hospital costs, if 
these are brought about by diseases that are sensitive to behaviours – again, regardless of the 
answer to the questions of whether they in fact are responsible for these behaviours. Such cost-
responsibility may also follow an ex ante model of taxation, which I will discuss afterwards. Both 
the ex post and the ex ante model may initially seek a justification in a paternalistic motive or in an 
aim to reduce (health care) costs. The ex post model first:  
 
Empirical evidence only supports our reasons to believe that health care insurance coverage 
reduces preventive effort to a very small degree. A recent study compares lifestyles before and 
after the age of 65 of those insured and those not insured pre the age of 65. It shows that there is 
no clear effect of the receipt of Medicare or its’ anticipation on either alcohol consumption or 
smoking behaviour, but that the previously uninsured do reduce physical activity just before 
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receiving Medicare.28 This evidence, however, may not be decisive. We therefore ought to 
consider why we would believe moral hazard is present in regards to health insurances?  
 
I think it is important to remember that the cure for most lifestyle-related diseases, that 
contemporary medicine is able to provide, is not complete. Even though much can be done about 
many cancer diseases and many heart diseases, it is the rule, rather than the exception, that the 
cure is not complete. Even after successful heart surgeries the patient remains a patient. So even 
though health care (and surgery) is better than no care, it still seems odd, and indeed irrational, if 
e.g. a smoker reasons that quitting would not be worth the effort, since if diseases occur then the 
doctors will simply cure her. I do not think this is widely held reasoning.29 However, it may still be 
the case that to some small degree individuals tend to care less about health preventive effort if 
they are insured than if they are not, and it may therefore be the case that the sum of health 
preventive effort is higher in a system where individuals are held ex post cost-responsible for their 
lifestyle diseases. Again, to hold individuals ex post cost-responsible for their lifestyle-related 
diseases based on an argument that it increases their health preventive effort may initially seek 
two kinds of justification. The first is paternalistic, and the second is to reduce (health care) costs. 
If our aim is paternalistic in the sense that we want individuals to take more health preventive 
effort for their own good, then, most importantly, we will have to be rather sure that such policy 
in fact is for the individuals’ own good, all things considered. But this does not seem to be the 
case. The health preventive effect of ex post cost-responsibility will have to be compared with the 
negative (welfare) effect of leaving individuals with unaffordable hospital bills or no health care at 
all. As the evidence on any preventive effect is so limited this seems to be very hard to justify. 
Furthermore: Even if it is true that fear of hospital bills (or no health care at all) increases 
individuals’ health preventive effort as such that fear most likely also has a negative effect: To fear 
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not being able to pay for a hospital bill is simply an unsafe circumstance, which, via the effect of 
stress on heart diseases, probably is not beneficial health-wise.30   
If our aim is not paternalistic, but merely to reduce health care costs, then we would first need to 
know whether more preventive effort in fact will lead to health care savings, or more broadly, 
socio-economic savings. As for what regards health care savings, this is a rather controversial 
question. In the case of smoking, there is a study that suggests that smokers cost more health 
care-wise than non-smokers31, but there are indeed also studies that suggests the opposite, 
namely that smokers cost less than non-smokers.32 If we broaden the scope to socio-economic 
savings, all things considered, I believe it is crucial to consider who, socio-economically speaking, it 
is that mostly fail to make health preventive efforts. As I state it in my second article in this 
dissertation:  
It might very well be a loss for society if high income-groups went from fountain 
water and fitness to cigarettes and whisky, but we know from studies of social 
inequality in health that smoking and obesity is more common the lower we go down 
the socio-economic hierarchy.33 Per definition these are the groups that contribute 
less, if at all, to the economy, and insofar their net contribution is negative, then the 
sooner they die the cheaper – ceteris paribus. 
However, this is an empirical question and I may be wrong. If more health preventive effort does 
lead to socio-economic savings, then in order to know whether we therefore ought to hold 
individuals ex post cost-responsible for diseases that are sensitive to behaviours, we would need 
to balance the moral value of these savings with our general distributive principle. If this principle 
is equality, then it seems very difficult to justify that costs associated with these behaviours should 
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be held exclusively by individuals having these behaviours (assuming these individuals to a large 
degree are worse off in terms of our general currency). If our principle is prioritarianism or 
sufficientarianism, or, given the principle of marginal utility, even utilitarianism, I guess such 
model of ex post taxation would be similarly difficult to justify.   
Moral hazard and ex ante cost-responsibility 
If there is ample room for health care savings, if individuals take more health preventive efforts, 
then we ought to remember that holding individuals ex post cost-responsible is not the only 
potential way to account for these savings. It seems e.g. to be evident that, at least to some 
degree, increase in tobacco prices reduces tobacco consumption.34 We may therefore want to 
increase tobacco prices (as already seems to be the case in at least the western world) just as we 
may want to impose taxes on other unhealthy products, such as alcohol, sugar, and animal fat. 
Such policies may be a way to hold individuals ex ante cost-responsible for behaviours leading to 
increased risks of diseases, and they need not necessarily have a paternalistic motive. We might 
just say to the individual, no, we do not impose these consumer taxes on you for your own well-
being – we just want to reduce our health care budget. Again, however, the moral value of such 
eventual socio-economic savings need to be balanced with our general distributive principle, and 
may therefore, and given the fact of social inequality in health, not be easy to justify.    
Finally, ex ante taxation on unhealthy behaviours may of course have a paternalistic motivation (or 
a combination of paternalism and an aim to reduce health care costs). If this is so, then, again, we 
would have to be rather sure that the taxation in fact is for the better for those on whom this tax 
is imposed. Again, we have reason to believe that if tobacco prices increase then tobacco 
consumption drops. Given the tobaccos’ enormous health-damaging effect this is a pro tanto 
reason actually to increase tobacco prices. However, it is not obvious that this would be a decisive 
reason. We need not only to know more about the size of the effect, but, depending on our 
distributional principle, also to know more about the distribution of this effect: Who, socio-
economically speaking, will actually quit or reduce their tobacco consumption? If equality in health 
is a value, and smokers among the worse off do not reduce tobacco consumption, then there is 
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not only no health benefit for them, but also, due to the increase in tobacco taxation, a reduction 
in their financial circumstances, ceteris paribus. Thus, in order to justify ex ante taxation of 
unhealthy behaviours for paternalistic reasons we would not only need to know more about the 
effect of such policies and the socio-economical distribution of that effect, but also how more 
precisely that knowledge fits with our distributional principle, e.g. equality. Due, not the least, to 
many empirical variables, I cannot speak decisively about these questions.35  
To sum up: Assuming some plausible distributional principle, such as egalitarianism, 
prioritarianism, sufficientarianism, or utilitarianism, then given the limited evidence of health-
related moral hazard, and the mixed evidence on socio-economic savings, it seems hard to justify 
holding individuals ex post responsible for the cost of diseases that are sensitive to behaviours for 
efficiency-based reasons. This seems so regardless of whether our motive for doing so has 
paternalistic roots, or stems from an aim to reduce costs.     
Again, assuming some plausible distributional principle, and given mixed evidence on socio-
economic savings, also ex ante taxation of health-damaging behaviours seems difficult to justify if 
the aim is to reduce costs. The most promising efficiency-based reason to hold individuals cost-
responsible is a model of ex ante taxation on health-damaging behaviours for paternalistic 
reasons. The justification for such a model, however, is sensitive to complicated empirical 
questions regarding not only the size of the effect, but also, depending on our distributional 
principle, the distribution of the effect.       
The question, then, is whether we should hold individuals cost-responsible for health-damaging 
behaviours if they are responsible for health-damaging behaviours? And if so, then we need to 
know whether individuals in fact are responsible for such behaviours, and we need to know more 
about the relation between responsibility and cost-responsibility. These are the focal questions 
that my articles aim to answer. Before that, however, I will elaborate on my methodology. 
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Most, if not all, arguments in philosophy are controversial, at least to different degrees. This may 
lead some, indeed non-philosophers included, into a mood of scepticism about philosophical 
justification. To this, (at least) two things are worth noting. First, fundamental doubt and 
scepticism are simply parts of philosophy’s nature. Philosophy deals with questions, different 
answers to which most non-philosophers, rightly or wrongly, simply take for granted. Second, 
philosopher’s scepticism is not limited to what we generally call philosophical questions, such as 
what is (morally) right, what is truth, and what is knowledge. Rather, as these questions are 
fundamental to all academic and intellectual disciplines, the philosophical scepticism goes straight 
into the heart of all such disciplines. For instance, if we cannot know what it takes for a method to 
be reliable, how can we trust any scientific activity? Ultimately, all scientific truth relies on the 
truth (or at least the justification) of answers to certain philosophical questions.  
Following Nils Holtug I believe the methodology in (reliable) analytical political philosophy is 
characterized (primarily) by four elements. These are 1) conceptual analysis, 2) consistency, 3) 
rationales and 4) intuitions.36 I will explain these elements, how I use them in my articles, and how 
they work in a coherence theory of moral and political justification.     
 
Conceptual analysis 
Conceptual analysis plays a substantive part in this dissertation. Conceptual analysis simply 
regards analysis of the concepts we use, which (mostly) is a matter of determining the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for correct use of the concepts that we use.37 A prime example regards 
one of my core questions, which is what it takes for an individual to be responsible for behaviours 
that lead to increased risks of diseases. When addressing this question we need namely know 
what it ultimately takes for an individual to be responsible for something. To answer that question 
we therefore need to analyze the concept of responsibility. Usually this proceeds as some kind of 
‘dialectical’ game between suggestions and counter-examples. For instance, here is the traditional 
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suggestion as for what it takes for an individual to be responsible. It is called the ability to do 
otherwise-requirement: 
A person P is responsible for an act (or omission), X, only if P had the ability to do 
otherwise, that is not to perform X.38 
 
In order to test whether the ability to do otherwise-requirement of responsibility is correct, we 
look at its’ implications. If someone comes up with a case where a person is (e.g.) not responsible 
according to this definition, but where this seems intuitively wrong, it gives us (at least) one pro 
tanto reason to reconsider the definition. Harry Frankfurt has given such case:  
Black wants Jones to kill Sam. Black is an excellent brain surgeon and is able to 
manipulate Jones brain processes. The next day, however, Jones decides for himself 
to kill Sam. Had he not decided to kill Sam, Black would have manipulated his brain 
so that he would have decided to do so. Now Jones kills Sam, and could not have 
done otherwise. Yet, Frankfurt claims, Jones is responsible for killing Sam, since he 
did it as a result of his own free will.39   
Frankfurt himself takes this case to imply that the ability to do otherwise-requirement is wrong. I, 
and others, do not, since if determinism is true then Jones cannot have a free will in the relevant 
sense, and even though it was not Black, who caused him to kill Sam, he still killed Sam due to 
(other) reasons that ultimately is beyond his control. The point here is of course not to settle this 
question, but to exemplify how conceptual analysis works. A main methodological element in 
discussions of responsibility is thus to establish exactly what it means to be responsible for 
something, and that is (at least partly) a matter of conceptual analysis.   
Consistency 
Consistency is, as in all intelligible thinking, a fundamental requirement of justification. 
Consistency requires first of all, but not only, freedom from contradiction. Quite trivially, P and 
non-P cannot both be true. But consistency also requires universalizability of a moral principle. 
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According to Hare this means that a judgment about one situation should be the same as a 
judgment about another situation in which all the moral relevant circumstances are identical.40 For 
instance, in the introduction to this dissertation I wrote that if responsibility matters as a 
constraint on what society owes to an individual in general, then it is hard to see why it should not 
matter in regards to health and health care. If it is not unjust that two individuals are unequal in 
terms of income and education because that inequality is due to choices, which the worst off is 
responsible for, then why should this principle not apply to inequality in health? Thus, if someone 
holds that responsibility matters in relation to income, but not in relation to health, then he needs 
to point out the relevant moral difference. If he cannot do so, then his judgment about justice in 
relation to health is inconsistent with his judgment about justice in relation to income and 
education. The point here is not to argue that there is no moral difference that could justify such 
division, but only to illustrate the implications of the requirement of consistency.     
 
Rationales 
Rationales refer to attempts to give more fundamental theoretical justifications for (political) 
principles, i.e. rationales.41 More precisely, our reason to believe in a (political) principle will be 
strengthened if it is justified (or even better, implied) by another more general principle. In my 
second article in this dissertation, “Reasonable Avoidability, responsibility, and lifestyle diseases”, I 
address the claim, put forward by Shlomi Segall, that: ”It is unjust for individuals to be worse off 
than others due to outcomes that it would have been unreasonable to expect them to avoid.”42 In 
seeking to understand the notion of Reasonable Avoidability, I argue that responsibility is a 
necessary condition for Reasonable Avoidability, such that it cannot be reasonable to expect an 
individual, I, to avoid X, unless I is responsible for X. I thus argue for a principle of Reasonable 
Avoidability, which entails responsibility as a necessary requirement. In support of this principle I 
refer to a more general principle, namely the very luck egalitarian principle, which states that it is 
unjust for an individual to be worse off than others due to no responsibility of her own. By doing 
so, I thus offer a rationale for my suggested principle of Reasonable Avoidability. I strengthen the 
justification of my suggested principle by showing that it is implied by a more general principle, 
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namely the principle of luck egalitarianism. Thus, if responsibility is not a necessary condition for 
Reasonable Avoidability then Reasonable Avoidability does not exclude the logical interpretation 
where it is in conflict with the principle of luck egalitarianism – it would leave open the possibility 
that it is reasonable to expect an individual, I, to avoid X, even though I is not responsible for X. 
 
Intuitions 
A significant methodological element in political (and moral) philosophy is the appeal to intuitions. 
Given the very question addressed in this discipline – how ought society be? – this is necessarily 
so, since, contrary to empirical disciplines, we do not have any empirical counterpart due to which 
we can test our theories. At least, so is it traditionally considered to be, and I will not argue 
otherwise.43 Rather, I believe we ultimately cannot go without appeals to intuitions. But intuitions 
should be challenged and tested: Given the fact of a plurality of contradictory intuitions among 
political philosophers, and indeed non-philosophers, it is namely so, that some of these must be 
wrong insofar we take political philosophy to be an intelligible discipline. How do we ultimately 
decide which intuitions are justified?  
In line with John Rawls and Norman Daniels I hold that we must try to create coherence between 
our (considered) moral intuitions (judgments), moral principles and relevant background theories 
(this is generally known as the method of wide reflective equilibrium).44 In line with these 
philosophers (and many others) I hold that coherentism is our general principle of justification, 
contrary to e.g. foundationalism. An intuition (in political philosophy) simply gains justification if it 
is coherent with other intuitions, principles (including rationales) and relevant background 
theories, and the more of such it is coherent with, the better it is justified, ceteris paribus. An 
intuition which is not coherent with other intuitions, principles etc. is therefore worth very little, 
justificationally speaking. Thus if we are to choose between two intuitions that contradict each 
other, we should trust the one that is coherent with most other intuitions, principles and 
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background theories, ceteris paribus.45 This, we may note, is very close to the method of inference 
to the best explanation.  
I appeal to intuitions, implicitly and explicitly, several times in this dissertation. In my fourth 
article, for instance, I set up a provisional suggestion as for what individuals should be held cost-
responsible for, health care cost-wise, if they are (partly) responsible for getting a disease, e.g. due 
to smoking. I provisionally suggest that an individual should be held cost-responsible for the 
difference between the costs of all her diseases and the costs of all her diseases in the nearest 
possible world where she (responsibly) behaves in no way that increases her risks of any diseases. 
Then I reject this suggestion by arguing that it is counter-intuitive, since it implies that two 
individuals, who behave in the exact same way as regards responsibility, e.g. by smoking, can end 
up being held differently cost-responsible due to random differences in their respective nearest 
(non-smoking) possible world. I thus appeal to the intuition that behaviours which, in terms of 




Especially regarding intuitions, there is an important methodological tool I believe should be 
explained. This is the ceteris paribus clause, i.e. the clause of holding everything ells equal or 
constant. I stress this since my use of this clause is extensive. In economical theory the clause is 
used to rule out the possibility of other factors that could influence the relation between a cause 
and an effect. For instance, increased tobacco price decreases tobacco consumption, ceteris 
paribus. By adding the ceteris paribus clause we acknowledge that there may be other causal 
reasons for an eventual decrease in tobacco consumption, or that there may be other factors that 
may cause absent of a decrease in tobacco consumption, even if the tobacco prize increases. In 
the methodology of political philosophy the ceteris paribus clause plays a similar role. Take for 
instance the luck egalitarian principle:  
 
                                                          
45
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It is unjust for an individual to be worse off than others due to no responsibility of 
her own, ceteris paribus.      
 
We simply use the ceteris paribus clause to isolate the moral (or political) relation between 
equality and responsibility. The principle states that if an individual is not responsible for being 
worse off than others, then in absence of other relevant reasons, it is unjustified that she is worse 
off than others. The inequality is unjustified, ceteris paribus. But we add the ceteris paribus clause, 
because there may be other moral (or political) reasons that could justify that an individual is 
worse off than others due to no responsibility of her own. Imagine, for instance, a society that 
consists of two individuals, John and Brian, who are not responsible for anything. Then imagine we 
can choose between the following two outcomes, where the numbers refers to each individual’s 
possession of our distributive currency:  
 
A:  John: 10  Brian: 10 
B: John: 50  Brian: 60 
 
In B there is inequality and in A there is no inequality. Since both John and Brian are not 
responsible for anything, the luck egalitarian principle cannot justify B. But, indeed, we have other 
moral reasons to prefer B over A, for instance a moral reason to prefer more of a certain good 
than less. Thus, even though luck egalitarianism cannot justify B, B may be justified all things 
considered (and even if the principle of luck egalitarianism is otherwise justified). The ceteris 
paribus clause simply enables us to analyze a moral question, here the relation between equality 
and responsibility, isolated from other (relevant) factors.        
 
Final remarks of methodology 
Thus, my methodology consists, roughly, in four basic elements, namely conceptual analysis, 
consistency, rationales and intuitions. They are elements in a coherence theory about moral and 
political justification. It is worth noting that the first three of them obviously also are elements in 
any coherence theory about descriptive matters (contrary to normative matters such as morality 
and politics); conceptual analysis is necessary in order to synchronize different views about the 
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semantic content of any concept; freedom from contradiction is a fundamental logic requirement 
of all intelligible activities; and seeking to give justificational force to a political or moral principle 
by appealing to a rationale does not differ from giving a rationale in support of one interpretation 
of empirical data over another. Interestingly, these elements may be controversial in the field of 
philosophy, but does not seem (at least similarly) controversial in most sciences.  
 
The controversial element is the appeal to intuitions, and the lack of empirical testability. I would 
like to mention two things disregarded:  
First, when I postulate that we cannot go without appeals to intuitions, I actually do not mean to 
limit that postulate to the field of moral and political philosophy. I apply the postulate to all 
intelligible thinking, including all sciences. As I stated in the beginning of this section, philosophical 
scepticism and doubt go straight into the heart of all scientific disciplines. Let me illustrate this 
point in terms of an example that is related to the problem of responsibility: That events have 
causes is basically an intuition.46 It is not something we directly can go out and test empirically in 
the same way as we can go out and test whether it is raining right now outside my office window 
here at University of Copenhagen, Southern Campus (provided that we agree on what it takes to 
be raining). However, I believe it is a very plausible intuition and so, hopefully, do most people. 
Why? Because we have quite a few indirect reasons to believe so. By assuming that, at least, most 
events have causal causes we can simply explain much more of what seems to be going on in this 
world. Were we to choose between two explanations of a natural or social phenomenon, where 
one of these contains the assumption that events have causes and the other the assumption that 
events do not have causes, I feel sure postulating that the first explanation in the majority of 
cases, regardless of our object, and even without forgetting quantum mechanics, would have 
much more explanatory force. That events have causal causes is simply most often an assumption 
that is contained in the best explanation. Furthermore: without this assumption many scientific 
investigations would be meaningless, since many, if not most, scientific investigations simply look 
for causal explanations of different phenomenon. I write this to remind us that we should not fear 
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intuitions as such. What we should fear, justificationally speaking, is only intuitions that are not 
supported by extensive reasons to believe in them.            
 
Second, the reason as for why moral and political judgments cannot be empirically tested is simply 
that moral and political questions are not ultimately empirical questions. Roughly speaking, it is 
not as if morality is out there in the space in the same way as atoms and animals. And it would not 
help us much to test how many percent of a certain population agrees in a certain moral or 
political statement. This is because many peoples’ judgments about moral and political statements 
rest on nothing but loose intuitions, many of which would not last long if made subject to 
analytical philosophical investigations. This, however, does not mean that we cannot 
systematically investigate moral and political questions. Moreover, if we deny that moral and 
political judgments can be justified, it ultimately implies that normative discussions to a large 
degree are meaningless. Without the assumption that moral and political principles can be 
justified, we are left with few (if any) meaningful options when insisting that our objections to the 
holocaust is not reducible to questions of how we like our coffee.       
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Are social inequalities in health unjust when brought about by differences in lifestyle? A 
widespread idea, luck egalitarianism, is that inequality stemming from individuals’ free choices is 
not to be considered unjust, since individuals, presumably, are themselves responsible for such 
choices. Thus, to the extent that lifestyles are in fact results of free choices, social inequality in 
health brought about by these choices is not in tension with egalitarian justice. If this is so, then it 
may put in question the justification of free and equal access to health care and existing medical 
research priorities. However, personal responsibility is a highly contested issue and in this article 
we first consider the case for, and second the case against, personal responsibility for health in 
light of recent developments in philosophical accounts of responsibility and equality. We suggest – 
but do not fully establish – that at the most fundamental level people are never responsible in such 
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The aim in this essay is to bring recent political philosophical discussions of responsibility in 
egalitarian and luck egalitarian theory to bear on issues of social inequality in health. We will 
consider how personal responsibility affects the question of when social inequalities in health are 
unjust. An answer to this question is of relevance to issues of how to prioritize within institutions 
of health and health care, including access and coverage of universal health care and the 
allocation of medical research funds. 
A considerable part of social inequality in health can be explained by differences in lifestyle. In the 
case of e.g. cardiovascular disease, the majority of the absolute differences (~70-80%) between 
social groups can probably be attributed to traditional risk factors which are related to lifestyle.48 
So we know that smoking, lack of exercise, eating fatty food etc. lead to increased risk of various 
diseases, and that such lifestyle-behaviors are more common among the socio-economically worse 
off. We therefore know that some health inequalities stem from differences in lifestyle. But are 
such differences not a matter of individuals’ own responsibilities? So why are social inequalities in 
health unjust, insofar as they reflect differences in lifestyle?    
Such intuitions seem pretty common. In the epidemiological literature we find perhaps most 
famously Whitehead’s article on “The concepts and principles of equity and health”49, in which she 
distinguishes between “health-damaging behavior if freely chosen, such as participation in certain 
sports and pastimes” and “health-damaging behavior where the degree of choice of lifestyles is 
severely restricted”. She suggests health inequality stemming from the former not to be viewed as 
inequities (unjust), but only those stemming from the latter. The intuitions furthermore seem to 
match a widespread theory within modern political philosophy known as luck egalitarianism: the 
                                                          
48
 Lynch, JW, Davey Smith, G, Harper, S, et al.; “Explaining the social gradient in coronary heart disease: comparing relative and 
absolute approaches”; Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health; 2006; 60; p. 435–441. And: Kivimäki, M, Shipley, MJ, Ferrie, 
JE, et al.; “Best-practice interventions to reduce socioeconomic inequalities of coronary heart disease mortality in UK: a prospective 
occupational cohort study”; The Lancet; 2008; 372; p. 1648-54. And: World Health Organization; Commission on social 
determinants of health – final report. Closing the gap in a generation: health equity through action on the social determinants of 
health; Geneva; WHO; 2008. Available at: http://www.who.int 
49
 Whitehead, M; “The Concepts and Principles of Equity and Health”; International Journal of Health Services; 1992; 22, no.3; p. 
429-445; pp. 433. 
Health, personal responsibility, and distributive justice. PhD dissertation. Martin Marchman Andersen. 
39 
 
idea that it is unjust for a person to be worse off than others through no choice or fault of her 
own.50 This may imply that if she is worse off due to her own choices, then the inequality is not 
unjust. 
The essay will run as follows: We will first frame the luck egalitarian intuition and contrast it with 
theories of justice in health that are insensitive to responsibility. Second we will consider the 
challenge of responsibility and discuss an attempt to moderate the claim that individuals generally 
are responsible for their lifestyle-related diseases. Third, we will consider some metaphysical 
discussions of responsibility. Here we will suggest the strong claim that responsibility, in the sense 
that affects distributive justice, is impossible. Fourth, as this is a strong claim, we will elaborate on 
what it implies. First, however, a few remarks of clarification: 
First, we will assume that insofar as we are concerned with inequality, we should be concerned 
with inequality in health. (Luck) egalitarians have come up with different suggestions as to what it 
is that people should have equal shares of – including welfare51, resources52 and capabilities53 – 
but each of these suggestions seems to imply that we should be concerned about the distribution 
of health. Second, (luck) egalitarians are most often value pluralists as there are difficult issues of 
balancing concerns of equality with efficiency. It is beyond the scope of this article to come up 
with suggestions as for how to balance these concerns. What we are concerned with is whether 
there are individual responsibility-based reasons not to care about some inequalities in health. 
Third, though it is common in social epidemiology we will not use the term inequity. This term is 
usually associated with a distinction between socially caused inequalities and biological variations, 
such that the latter are not to be considered inequities. In line with the luck egalitarian literature, 
where this distinction is generally considered to be morally arbitrary (because we are responsible 
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neither for the social environment or the genes we are born with), we will address whether 
inequalities are unjust, and this they may be for both social and biological reasons.54        
The luck egalitarian intuition 
Imagine that Peter and Thomas are equally capable of performing, and Peter decides to only be 
part-time employed in order to get more time to cultivate his garden. We may then tend to 
believe that the resulting income inequality between the two is not unjust. Similarly, we might say 
that the potential health inequality between the two is not unjust, if it results from Peter’s 
decision to smoke, and Thomas’ decision not to smoke. Even though many people seem to share 
the luck egalitarian intuition,55 initially it seems we have reason to be more concerned about 
inequality in health than in income when these are due to lifestyles. One reason for this is the 
potential conflict between responsibility and the ideal of free and equal access to health care, 
which is roughly illustrated in Elisabeth Anderson’s abandonment objection: 
“Consider an uninsured driver who negligently makes an illegal turn that causes an accident with 
another car. Witnesses call the police, reporting who is at fault; the police transmit this 
information to emergency medical technicians. When they arrive at the scene and find that the 
driver at fault is uninsured, they leave him to die by the side of the road.”56 
Contemporary discussions therefore often focus on whether distributive justice in health should 
be sensitive to responsibility at all.57 If one denies responsibility in health, the challenge is to 
justify health as special in the sense that it avoids matters of responsibility. But such theories, 
however strong they might be, are rather avoiding the question of responsibility than answering it, 
and more importantly, it is far from clear that the abandonment objection is a decisive objection 
to luck egalitarianism.   
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In a recent book Shlomi Segall has defended a luck egalitarian approach to justice in health and 
health care. He concludes that in order not to abandon the imprudent, luck egalitarianism needs 
to be combined with a model of meeting basic needs.58 But insofar as it is possible, he maintains, 
costs associated with imprudent behavior, such as smoking, eating fatty food and dangerous 
sporting-activities, can fairly be passed on to the imprudent themselves. For a broad range of 
reasons, however, the costs should be charged ex ante and not ex post. This means, for example, 
that when a smoker ends up in a hospital, with say lung cancer, then she and her fellow smokers 
have already paid for the treatment through taxes imposed on each single pack of tobacco. It 
therefore seems possible never to abandon the imprudent, and yet pass on the costs of imprudent 
behavior in accordance with the luck egalitarian intuition. 
However, personal responsibility for health does not only affect the question of access to health 
care. It determines whether and when inequalities are unjust. So if we accept that individuals are 
responsible for (some) lifestyle choices, such as smoking, then it follows that the inequality in 
health between those who smoke and those who do not is not unjust. To accept this may have 
quite serious implications, e.g. on publicly funded research: why give a high priority to say 
research on lung cancer, if, as suggested, 95,1% of lung cancer patients are smokers or former 
smokers, and hence, ex hypothesi, responsible for their own situation?59 
This, however, is not a conclusive objection. It can be argued that such research should have a 
high priority, but that the costs should also be paid ex ante by smokers. It seems therefore that 
responsibility-sensitive universal health care (and research) is possible without abandoning the 
imprudent. But again, this is not an answer to the basic question: are individuals responsible for 
their increased risk of lifestyle-related diseases, and if not, then following the luck egalitarian 
intuition, we would not want them to pay themselves for the treatment of and the research into 
these diseases.  
Of course, we might be willing to accept selective taxation of unhealthy lifestyles for paternalistic 
reasons. For example, it has been shown that tobacco consumption goes down when the tobacco 
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prices go up.60 By taxing tobacco we can potentially reduce the number of smokers for the 
smokers’ own good. But accepting such a policy is possible quite independently of considerations 
of personal responsibility, and it is likely that we will recommend different levels of taxation 
depending on whether our aim is to prevent smoking or to hold smokers responsible for the costs 
of their smoking. Therefore, in order to consider how personal responsibility affects the question 
of when social inequalities in health are unjust it is important to keep these matters apart.   
Degrees of responsibility 
However elegant the solutions we find to secure responsibility-sensitive universal health care, 
personal responsibility for health and the luck egalitarian intuition still imply that social 
inequalities in health are not unjust when stemming from differences in lifestyles. So, if we believe 
that it is unfair to hold smokers responsible for the costs of their smoking, it might be better to 
challenge the assumption that smokers are, or always are, responsible for their smoking. We 
might instead ask whether lower socio-economic groups’ higher risk of morbidity and premature 
death is a result of their social circumstances or of their lifestyle choices?  
Making this distinction seems to be Whitehead’s ambition when considering the difference 
between “health-damaging behavior if freely chosen (…)”, and “health-damaging behavior where 
the degree of choice of lifestyles is severely restricted”.61 How then, can we capture such a 
difference in a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice? The American economist John Roemer 
has suggested that degrees of personal responsibility may be sensitive to social class. If say a 
university professor and a steelworker have smoked the same amount of cigarettes for an equal 
number of years, then the university professor is simply more responsible than the steelworker, 
since smoking is more common among steelworkers and the single steelworker therefore is more 
exposed to circumstances where smoking occurs.62 
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This approach, however, is sensitive to serious objections. As Norman Daniels has pointed out 
there seems to be something counter-intuitive about letting responsibility be sensitive to what 
others do. For example, since skiing is more common among rich people, the approach would 
imply that a poor person is more responsible for his broken leg in a skiing accident than is a rich 
person.63 This seems counter-intuitive.  
Conditions for responsibility 
A more fundamental examination of the question of personal responsibility for health needs to 
consult the more direct philosophical attempts to find the right conditions for responsibility. What, 
basically, does it take for a person to be responsible? 
In the philosophical literature it is traditionally said that a person must control her actions in order 
to be responsible: she must be able to do otherwise. But whether a person can do otherwise 
inevitably depends on whether her actions are caused by herself. An often raised objection is 
therefore that if the world is deterministic, then she cannot be causing her own actions.  
However, in contemporary philosophy it has been argued that we need not settle the question of 
determinism before assessing responsibilities.64 Determinism rests on the assumption that if we 
have complete knowledge of the world at time T1, then that knowledge in conjunction with 
complete knowledge of the laws of nature enables us (in principle) to know everything about the 
world at any later time, T2.65 But we need not accept such a strong claim to rule out responsibility. 
This is because of another idea that underlies the thought that determinism makes responsibility 
impossible, namely what Susan Hurley has labeled the regression-requirement:66 
For a person to be responsible for something, X, she must be responsible for the causes of X. 
This requirement matches the common sense intuition that we cannot be responsible for 
something we have not caused (controlled or influenced), like the color of our eyes. Responsibility 
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therefore seems to require responsibility for causes in the regressive sense, which means that in 
order for a person to be responsible for the causes of X, she must also be responsible for the 
causes of these causes and so on.  
Now, if we (quite plausibly) assume every event to be a result of previous causes – whether the 
world is deterministic or merely probabilistic – then the requirement has quite far-reaching 
consequences: Whatever we do is a result of previous circumstances such as social circumstances 
and our genetic composition. Since the requirement is regressive it implies that we should be 
responsible for not only these circumstances and that composition, but also the causes thereof – 
things that happened even before we were born, which is clearly implausible. We can never meet 
the condition of regression, and we can therefore never be responsible at the most fundamental 
level.67     
The point is therefore not that there are social circumstances under which individuals are more 
responsible than under other such circumstances, which otherwise seems plausible from a 
sociological point of view. Rather, we are never truly responsible for anything, and luck 
egalitarianism therefore implies that all (relevant) inequalities are unjust, ceteris paribus. 
However, this conclusion only follows on the assumption that causality-regression is what 
responsibility requires. But this is contestable. Very prominent in contemporary political 
philosophy has been the suggestion that what matters for responsibility is rather whether a 
person’s acts are consistent with what she really wants (or who she really is).68  
Ronald Dworkin has thus suggested that we can theoretically test for responsibility by offering a 
preference-changing pill.69 If we are to determine whether a smoker is responsible for smoking, 
we need to know whether she would take such pill if it existed, such that she would then no longer 
prefer to smoke. If she is willing to take the pill then she is not responsible, but if she is not willing 
to take it, then she is. In the latter case, being a smoker is then to be viewed as a part of who she 
really is.   
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If such an approach is plausible, then even though it is possible to ascribe responsibility to some 
individuals, it is noteworthy that it hardly implies that individuals in general are responsible for 
their increased risk of lifestyle-related diseases. Rather, it seems, behaviors leading to increased 
risk of diseases are often characterized by something the individual – at least to some extent – 
aims to suppress. An American study shows that 79% of those who smoke would like to give it 
up.70 
Nonetheless, this approach to responsibility is vulnerable to different objections. Most 
importantly, if we perform all our acts for reasons beyond our control, then what we 
hypothetically would do (whether we would take the pill) seems similarly to be a result of reasons 
beyond our control. This seems to match the common sociological view that what we want to be is 
heavily influenced by social attitudes in our environment. The approach therefore needs to 
account for how a person can come to form beliefs about what she wants in hypothetical 
scenarios in such a way that is not decisively vulnerable to this objection.        
Implications  
Many people tend to find the conclusion that responsibility is ultimately impossible somewhat 
unattractive. It is contestable what it fundamentally takes for an individual to be responsible, and 
in this article we can therefore by no mean fully establish this conclusion.  But given it’s strong 
plausibility, it is important to clarify what it actually implies. T.M. Scanlon has made a very useful 
distinction between what he calls attributive and substantive responsibility. Responsibility in the 
former sense simply implies that it is appropriate to make a person subject for moral appraisal. In 
the latter sense responsibility regards substantive claims about what people are required to do for 
each other.71 This distinction is very useful since if real responsibility is impossible, then it does not 
follow that we should not be subject to moral criticism. Rather it is a good thing to criticize each 
other, insofar there are reasons to believe we thereby change our behavior in desirable ways. 
Similarly, the impossibility of responsibility does not imply that we cannot have a system of 
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punishment, but only that the criminal is not ultimately responsible. Naturally we would still want 
to punish the criminal, since we would still want to prevent crime.         
Scanlon’s distinction is therefore helpful since the conclusion that responsibility is impossible 
mostly affects substantive responsibility, which is what regulates distributive justice. But it leaves it 
open for us to ascribe attributive responsibility to individual actions, and assess them as blame- or 
praiseworthy.    
So regarding “lifestyle diseases” it is also clear that there is nothing wrong per se about appealing 
to individuals’ own responsibility for taking care of their health. The point is rather that whether 
we should do so ultimately depends on whether it actually leads to good consequences, i.e. 
whether individuals actually tend to change behavior as intended, which is an empirical question. 
If we accept the conclusion that responsibility is fundamentally impossible it follows from luck 
egalitarianism that all otherwise relevant inequalities are unjust – ceteris paribus. The latter 
reservation, however, is quite important, since we may have other reasons not to correct for 
inequality, such as reasons of efficiency, incentive regulation and, especially important in a health 
context, how to balance our aim for equality with respect for personal freedom. Clear-cut 
suggestions are beyond the scope of this essay. If one does not wish to put too many restrictions 
on the freedom to smoke, one might be left with a rather limited scope for policy making. But 
even though there might then be nothing we can legitimately do about the health inequality 
between e.g. smokers and non-smokers it should not be thought that the inequality is just – 
ceteris paribus. First, given medical progress there might later be something we can do about it. 
Second, when this inequality is unjust, it explains why we should give free and equal health care 
access to individuals affected by diseases for which lifestyle choices are a risk factor. Or, at least, 
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Reasonable Avoidability, Responsibility, and Lifestyle Diseases72 73 
 




In “Health, Luck and Justice” Shlomi Segall argues for a luck egalitarian approach to justice in 
health care. As the basis for a just distribution he suggests a principle of Reasonable Avoidability, 
which he takes to imply that we do not have justice-based reasons to treat diseases brought about 
by imprudent behavior such as smoking and over-eating. While I seek to investigate how more 
precisely we are to understand this principle of Reasonable Avoidability, I also object to it. First, I 
argue that Segall neither succeeds in showing that individuals quite generally are responsible for 
behaviors such as smoking and over-eating, nor that responsibility is ultimately irrelevant for the 
principle of Reasonable Avoidability. Second, I object to an argument of Segall’s, according to 
which the size of the health-care costs related to smoking and obesity is irrelevant for whether 
society reasonably can expect individuals to avoid smoking and obesity. Finally, I come up with a 
suggestion for how to modify the principle of Reasonable Avoidability so that it can answer my 
objection.     
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In his book Health, Luck, and Justice, Shlomi Segall argues that people with risky lifestyles place 
unnecessary burdens on the health care system.74 He therefore suggests a luck egalitarian 
approach to justice in health care based on a principle of Reasonable Avoidability (henceforth: RA): 
It is unjust for individuals to be worse off than others due to outcomes that it would 
have been unreasonable to expect them to avoid.75  
He maintains that we can reasonably expect individuals to exercise, not to smoke, drink, overeat, 
and the like, and therefore justice does not require society to bear the costs related to such risky 
behaviors. In order not to abandon the imprudent, however, he suggests a model of meeting basic 
needs to complement the luck egalitarian distribution of health care. To compensate society for 
the latter, alcohol, tobacco, fatty food etc. should be taxed ex ante proportionally such as to cover 
the expenses related to the diseases they bring about (hospital expenses etc.).  
In this article I will investigate and object to Segall’s principle of RA as the basis of a just 
distribution of health care. First I briefly outline Segall’s use of, and arguments for, RA. Second, I 
suggest that in order to justify the claim that society does not have justice-based reasons to treat 
diseases stemming from behaviors such as smoking and over-eating, Segall must either show that 
individuals quite generally are responsible for smoking and over-eating, or (as it is possible to read 
him as implying this) that responsibility is irrelevant for RA. I argue that the latter clashes with our 
basic (luck egalitarian) intuitions and that it therefore may be better for Segall to demonstrate the 
former. Segall further argues that the size of the costs related to a certain behavior (such as 
smoking) is irrelevant for our considerations about whether we should count that behavior as 
reasonably avoidable. Third, I object to this argument and discuss four potential solutions to it. 
Finally I suggest a modified principle of RA. I will henceforth exemplify primarily in terms of cases 
of smoking, but this is mainly because smoking serves as an excellent clear-cut case. I believe my 
arguments hold in principle for most, if not all, behaviors leading to increased risks of diseases.   
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The Abandonment Objection and the idea of RA 
The standard objection to a luck egalitarian approach to justice in health care is the abandonment 
objection given by Elisabeth Anderson:  
Consider an uninsured driver who negligently makes an illegal turn that causes an 
accident with another car. Witnesses call the police, reporting who is at fault; the 
police transmit this information to emergency medical technicians. When they arrive 
at the scene and find that the driver at fault is uninsured, they leave him to die by 
the side of the road.76 
Segall’s response to this objection is based primarily on his value pluralism, which consists of a 
combination of luck egalitarianism and a model of meeting basic needs. The idea is this: since we 
can reasonably expect individuals e.g. not to smoke, justice does not require that we treat e.g. 
lung cancer patients, when their disease is due to smoking. But, quite importantly, this does not 
mean that morality demands that we do not treat such patients, but only that we do not have 
justice-based reasons to do so. There might be other moral reasons to treat them, and according 
to Segall there is a moral reason to meet individuals’ basic needs.77 When we do so, however, we 
can fairly pass on the costs of such treatments to the imprudent individuals themselves in terms of 
ex ante taxation of tobacco, alcohol, fatty food etc. 
In order, in fact, to avoid the abandonment objection, however, it seems we would need not just 
to pass on the costs of such treatments, but also the costs of rather far-reaching medical research 
programs in e.g. lung cancer, since research in such diseases otherwise would have a very low 
priority. Why would we give any high priority to research in lung cancer, if 9 out of 10 instances 
are brought about by smoking and we reasonably can expect individuals not to smoke? A plausible 
system of ex ante taxation would therefore need to include such research costs.   
Assuming that this in fact can be done in a plausible manner, and that Segall therefore meets the 
abandonment objection, the crucial question remains: which diseases do we have justice-based 
reasons to fund the research of and treat?  
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Segall suggests more precisely that we should “… replace ‘responsibility’ with a more plausible 
understanding of what constitutes a case of brute luck.” Thus, he maintains, we should 
understand ‘brute luck’ as an “…outcome of actions (including omissions) that it would have been 
unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid (or not to avoid in case of omissions).” And he stresses 
that ‘expectation’ is to be understood as a normative expectation rather than an epistemic one: 
“We are not inquiring here into what people are likely to do, but rather what it is that society can 
reasonably expect of them.”78 
But which principle, then, should guide us in deciding which outcomes of actions it is unreasonable 
to expect individuals to avoid? Unfortunately, Segall is not very informative here, though he 
provides us with a number of examples of what is reasonably avoidable:  
1) People residing in certain parts of California are (often) responsible for choosing to live on 
a geographical fault line. However, it would be unreasonable to expect them not to settle 
in these areas owing to the slight chance of being hit by an earthquake.79 
This, Segall continues, is in contrast to smoking:  
2) A geographical choice of residence is different from the decision to smoke, for example (as 
the latter does involve what most people would consider a legitimate trade-off between 
prudence and pleasure).80 
So according to Segall individuals are responsible for where they reside and for their choice of 
smoking. But RA would, ceteris paribus, require that we compensate individuals in case of an 
earthquake, but not in case of e.g. smoking-induced lung cancer. Why, more precisely, this is so 
seems to be a bit unclear. It seems to me that if RA should replace responsibility as the basis for 
our account of luck in a principle of just health care distribution, then we would need to know 
more about it in order to justify (for instance) this distinction between smoking and earthquake 
risks. So what is it reasonable to expect individuals to avoid? An initial suggestion might regard 
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what is in the individuals’ best interest81, but this can hardly be Segall’s intention, since his 
principle of RA has a non-paternalistic motivation: 
In that sense imposing the costs of treatment on the imprudent is not a paternalistic 
policy. Rather, according to my proposal those costs are passed on to the imprudent 
not because they have failed to take good care of themselves as such, but rather 
because they have avoidably burdened the public health care system.82  
I will get back to the question of how to read RA. First I will seek to clarify how RA relates to 
responsibility. 
Does RA Require Responsibility? 
A main point in replacing responsibility with RA seems to be this: there are several cases in which 
we intuitively find it unreasonable to expect an individual, A, to avoid something, X, even though A 
prima facie seems to be responsible for X. To take some of Segall’s examples: It is unreasonable to 
expect A not to reside in certain parts of California even though A is responsible for residing there. 
Or even though firefighters are responsible for incurring burns, it would be unreasonable to expect 
them to avoid them.83 I believe there are many such cases. But these cases are premised on the 
assumption that individuals in fact are responsible for where they reside or for becoming 
firefighters. Similarly, when Segall maintains that it is reasonable to expect individuals to avoid 
smoking, overeating, inactivity etc., it seems to be based on the assumption that individuals in fact 
are responsible for such activities and omissions. But is this really so? And does it matter for RA?  
Again, Segall states that RA is based on a normative societal expectation, and when doing so he 
refers to Ripstein’s article on “Equality, Luck, and Responsibility”.84 In this article Ripstein states 
that: 
In purely naturalistic terms, there is no obvious place to stop in tracing back the 
causes of behavior.85 
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This point seems to be broadly accepted (among contemporary philosophers), since agent-
causality, which is the idea that individuals can somehow start new causal chains that are not pre-
determined, has been shown not to be plausible. Any attempt to justify responsibility on a premise 
of free will, where free will means that individuals are free to determine their own will (not 
whether they are free to do what they want), seem therefore based on a false premise.86 In this 
sense, whatever we do is due to reasons beyond our control.   
However, Ripstein accepts this, but states that:  
The appropriate response (…) is not to give an anti-naturalistic metaphysical account 
of responsibility, nor to naturalize the notion. It is rather to change the subject, and 
make responsibility a question that is – to borrow a phrase from Rawls – political, not 
metaphysical.87 
A crucial question is therefore whether Segall hereby suggests that responsibility is irrelevant for 
RA? Recall that he suggests a replacement of responsibility with RA. But does this mean that we 
should avoid the concept of responsibility? Or merely that responsibility is one condition for a just 
basis of distribution, but that more conditions are required? Again, there seems to be a potential 
gain in replacing responsibility with RA when it comes to the following type of sentence, call it 
sentence-type A: 
A) It is unreasonable to expect A to avoid X, even though A is responsible for X.  
The opposite, however, seems less appealing. Call it sentence-type B: 
B) It is reasonable to expect A to avoid X, even though A is not responsible for X.          
If Segall means to suggest that responsibility is irrelevant for RA, then RA implicitly allows for 
sentence-type B. It may be that he (and Ripstein) would prefer something like a sentence-type C: 
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C) It is reasonable to expect A to avoid X, if X is conventionally accepted to be reasonably 
avoidable.88 
But such a formulation does not escape the logical conclusion: If C does not premise that 
responsibility is a necessary condition, then it necessarily allows for sentence-type B.  
Now, imagine the following (by reframing a Frankfurt-case):89 
Jones is a smoker who considers quitting rather often. Black however, who is an excellent brain 
surgeon, wants Jones to continue smoking. Therefore, without Jones’ knowledge, Black implants a 
mechanism in Jones’ brain so that he can supervise and intervene in his brain-processes. The next 
day Jones in fact decides to quit smoking, but shortly after Black activates the mechanism in Jones’ 
brain, so that Jones decides to undo his decision and hence lights up another cigarette.  
Here it seems obvious that Jones is not responsible for smoking. But can we reasonably expect him 
not to smoke? I think this expectation clashes with our basic (luck egalitarian) intuitions. It simply 
seems counter-intuitive to allow for sentence-type B when looking for the basis of a just 
distribution. There may be particular cases where we would allow for sentence-type B, but they 
would require particularly good other reasons. I will get back to this in the conclusion.  
However, if RA on the other hand does require responsibility, and sentence-type B therefore is not 
an issue, then Segall needs to point out in virtue of what individuals are responsible for smoking, 
over-eating, inactivity etc. There are several concepts of responsibility claiming to be compatible 
with the nonexistence of free will. One way to go is to follow Frankfurt, which seems very 
prominent in contemporary political philosophy,90 and suggest that what matters for responsibility 
is whether a person’s acts are consistent with what she really wants (or who she really is).91 If such 
an approach is plausible, then it is important to note that it hardly follows that individuals in 
general are responsible for smoking, physical inactivity and over-eating. Rather, it seems, such 
behaviors are often characterized by something the individual – at least to some extent – aims to 
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suppress. In fact an American study shows that 79% of those who smoke would like to give it up.92 
Thus, in Dworkin’s terms, the taste for smoking is one with which smokers do not in general 
identify, and to that extent it is therefore comparable to a handicap.   
It seems Segall must either show that responsibility is irrelevant for RA, or argue for some concept 
of responsibility in virtue of which individuals quite generally are responsible for behaviors leading 
to increased risks of diseases.   
If Responsibility, then Responsibility for What?  
Now suppose, ex hypothesi, individuals are responsible for smoking, over-eating, physical inactivity 
(etc.) and therefore for their increased risks of diseases. Then what follows? What should this 
responsibility be linked to? Segall’s answer to this question is ‘avoidable burdens of the public 
health care system’.93 But are smokers, over-eaters and the physically inactive really burdening the 
public health care system? And how should we understand the idea of a burden?   
In 2008 van Baal et al. published a study showing that the ultimo lifetime health care costs are 
higher for ‘healthy’ people than for smokers and for the obese.94 The explanation behind this, 
perhaps surprising, study is mostly that smokers and the obese die early and therefore avoid many 
diseases that individuals otherwise get, when they grow older. Now suppose these results are 
true. Would it change the perspective regarding whether we have justice-based reasons to treat 
diseases stemming from these behaviors? In fact Segall considers this objection: 
Suppose, however, that it does turn out that smokers save the health care system 
money, and that those pursuing healthier lifestyles are the ones who burden the 
system. Would the implications be embarrassing for the luck egalitarian health care 
system?95 
He rejects this and maintains that: 
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The justification for passing on the costs of treatment to the imprudent was based on 
the premise that they unnecessarily burden the health care system.96 
So we might say that whenever someone enters a hospital with a need for treatment, then the 
system is burdened. And burdens stemming from behaviors that we reasonably can expect 
individuals to avoid are unnecessary burdens. As such the price is irrelevant. If your need for 
treatment stems from a behavior that it would be unreasonable to expect you to avoid, then it is a 
necessary burden. But why is this distinction relevant seen from a societal perspective, if the 
necessary burdens are more expensive than the unnecessary burdens? Consider the following 
case:  
Suppose Peter lives in a Valley, where there are 2 villages, A and B. Peter resides in B and B is 
smaller than A. Returning from the hill Peter discovers that a dam is about to crack, so a flood is 
about to come. B is closest to the hill. Just outside of it there is a Y-cross in the river with a 
removable dam. Now peter faces 2 relevant options. 1: He can use the dam to lead the flood away 
from B, and thereby also protect his own house. But the flood will then be directed to A – the larger 
village – and, Peter has reason to believe, cause more damage. 2: He can use the dam to protect 
the larger village A by leading the flood into B, but he will thereby also damage his own house. 
Option 2 will lead to fewer costs for the Valley than option 1.  
Suppose Peter chooses option 2. Does the Valley have a justice-based reason to deny him 
compensation for the damage on his house? Is the damage on his house an unnecessary burden? 
It is indeed hard to see why, and if not, then how is this case different from the case of smokers, or 
over-eaters? I can think of four possible answers: 
1: Paternalism 
There seems to be a widely accepted definition of paternalism offered by G. Dworkin97:  X acts 
paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z, iff: 
A Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y. 
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B X does so without the consent of Y. 
C X does so just because Z will improve the welfare of Y (where this includes preventing 
his welfare from diminishing), or in some way promote the interests, values, or good 
of Y. 
Paternalism may motivate an attempt to justify a relevant difference between the Peter and the 
dam-case above and the case of smoking: Holding smokers cost-responsible for smoking may 
serve as an incentive to quit smoking. However, as Segall includes a premise of non-paternalism in 
RA this is not an available solution for him. I will get back to this in the conclusion.  
2: The Size of Risk 
So how can it be plausible to tax smokers even if smoking generally leads to savings, and for non-
paternalistic reasons? Is it somehow unfair to let others pay for particular instances of imprudent 
behavior? Is it a matter of the size of the risk rather than the size of the costs and rather than what 
the risk regards? Does RA regard the very risk of burdening the public health care system? 
Now recall Segall’s claim that it is unreasonable to expect individuals not to settle in certain parts 
of California owing to the slight chance of being hit by an earthquake. So some ‘avoidable’ burdens 
are unreasonable to expect individuals to avoid, and some are not, e.g. those stemming from 
smoking. If we assume that the very risk, i.e. the accidence-frequency, of burdening the health 
care system due to smoking is higher than due to earthquakes in California, then we may explain 
why we do not have justice-based reasons to treat the former, but only the latter: It is 
unreasonable to expect individuals to avoid X, if the risk (accidence-frequency) of burdening the 
health care system, due to X, is lower than Y. 
Consider the following case:  
Imagine a new product entering the market. Call it Cigrays. It’s a kind of a gum – addictive, just as 
smoking, which soon 20% of the population comes to like. As it turns out after some years 99% of 
those who have been enjoying Cigrays simply die when they are in their late sixties. They simply die 
from what look like very effective heart attacks, and they therefore never arrive at the hospital 
with any needs. The remaining 1%, however, gets terribly sick – equally in their late sixties – and 
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will thus be in need of treatment. The treatment is possible, but so expensive that the net health 
care costs for Cigrays-users are higher than for any other societal groups.   
Now as it turns out, the fact that 99% of those enjoying Cigrays simply die, the risk of burdening 
the health care system due to Cigrays is lower than Y. Segall would simply have to say that it is 
unreasonable to expect individuals to avoid Cigrays due to the slight chance of burdening the 
health care system. Smoking, on the other hand, the related accidence-frequency of which we 
assume to be higher than Y, would still be a reasonably avoidable behavior, irrelevant to the costs. 
I do not think this is what Segall means to suggest. 
3: Societal Interest 
It has been suggested to me that what we should consider (un)reasonable should be considered in 
light of what society has an interest in promoting. If we imagine skiing, smoking, giving birth and 
driving to work are equally dangerous activities, then society still only has an interest in promoting 
the latter two. There might be a high health-related risk in the latter two activities, but it is 
somehow a vital societal interest to promote them.98 
Now, whereas this may sound promising at a prima facie level, I think we are just moving from one 
ambiguous concept: reasonable avoidability – to another: vital societal interest. However, if we 
nonetheless accept that driving to work and giving birth are somehow activities of vital societal 
interest, whereas smoking is not, then it still does not seem to follow that we should exclude 
treatment of smoking-related diseases from the scope of justice.  
Smoking may not be a vital societal interest, but this does not imply that it is a vital societal 
interest that individuals do not smoke. Suppose again that smoking is not a financial net burden, 
and recall Segall’s premise of non-paternalism. On which ground can society consider non-smoking 
a vital interest if it is cost-saving and if it is not for the good of the smokers, i.e. to promote their 
welfare? In order to answer this, we must ask whether society is more than the sum of 
individuals? If we hold that it is not, and if smoking leads to cost-savings, then it is difficult to see 
why society should consider non-smoking as a vital interest. It seems such an approach falls back 
on paternalism, since a societal interest in non-smoking most likely can be reduced to the interest 
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of those who actually smoke – assuming, quite plausibly, that it is in the smokers’ interest to quit 
smoking. 
I see three possible objections to this conclusion: 
First, Segall might claim that society somehow is more than the sum of individuals. A discussion of 
this question is beyond the scope of this article, but in a liberal tradition – a tradition endorsed by 
Segall himself – it seems to be a very controversial assumption. However, even if society is more 
than the sum of individuals – that is, if we have moral obligations to society in a way that cannot 
be reduced to individuals – then it must still be argued why non-smoking is a vital interest – why it 
is decisively important.  
Second, it might be argued that society has a vital interest in non-smoking, since it has an interest 
in preventing secondhand smoking. Whereas this is an interesting objection, it is also a contingent 
objection. Following the trend from most of the western world, we might suggest that smoking 
should be illegal in public places, or somehow limit smoking to places where non-smokers are 
sufficiently warned before entering. Furthermore, this objection is not relevant in all cases of 
imprudent behavior, e.g. over-eating and physical inactivity.  
Third, some might think we should not just worry about secondhand smoking, but also about 
whether smokers may function as role-models and therefore cause others to start smoking. But 
such a worry would be hard to justify, since Segall already seems to assume that smokers are 
responsible for smoking. This issue, of course, would be irrelevant if RA is insensitive to 
responsibility, but as I have argued, such an approach seems to have its own problems of 
justification.   
Insofar as smoking is not a financial burden, and insofar we wish to avoid paternalism, it therefore 
seems difficult to find justified reasons to consider non-smoking a vital societal interest.   
4: Other Costs 
There is, however, one objection that seems more convincing and that may justify the relevant 
difference between smoking and my case of Peter and the dam. It might be suggested that not 
only health care costs should be considered, but also matters such as a loss in productivity. 
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I am unsure whether it goes beyond what we owe to each other in a liberal society to include non-
health care costs in deciding this question. But even if we allow for it, I am not sure it would 
change the conclusion. On the one hand it seems reasonable to assume that smokers and the 
obese statistically take more days sick than do ‘healthy’ people, which may lead to a loss in 
productivity. But the consequences of living an unhealthy life often occur late in life, and we 
therefore, on the other hand, might gain significantly due to a drop in pension expenses (minus 
taxes of these unpaid pensions). 
However, these are contingent and empirical questions, and we can only hope that someone will 
do the study. Perhaps the most important variable concerns the question of who in the socio-
economic hierarchy actually leads unhealthy lives. It might very well be a loss for society if high 
income-groups went from fountain water and fitness to cigarettes and whisky, but we know from 
studies of social inequality in health that smoking and obesity is more common the lower we go 
down the socio-economic hierarchy.99 Per definition these are the groups that contribute less, if at 
all, to the economy, and insofar their net contribution is negative, then the sooner they die the 
cheaper – ceteris paribus.  
Redefining RA 
In this article I have first argued that in order to justify that society does not have justice-based 
reasons to treat diseases stemming from smoking, over-eating etc., Segall must either show that 
responsibility is irrelevant for RA, or that individuals quite generally are responsible for these 
behaviors. I have argued that it is counter-intuitive to allow for a principle of distribution from 
which it follows that it can be reasonable to expect A to avoid X, even though A is not responsible 
for X. Segall may therefore want to argue for a concept of responsibility from which it follows that 
individuals quite generally are responsible for smoking, over-eating etc. But, as I have also 
suggested, this might be a difficult challenge.   
Second, I have argued that it is hard to see that the total size of the costs related to a certain 
behavior, such as smoking, is irrelevant for our consideration of whether we should count that 
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behavior as reasonably avoidable. Moreover, when RA is premised on non-paternalism, I find it 
difficult to see how non-smoking eventually can be a vital societal interest – this is under general 
liberal assumptions and as long as smoking is (net) cost-saving. Here lies an important empirical 
question in determining the general costs of smoking (and other risky behaviors) as well as an 
important normative question in determining how to do the calculation, i.e. determining which 
costs to include. 
I endorse Segall’s intuition, according to which it can be unreasonable to expect A to avoid X, even 
though A is responsible for X. This intuition gives some reason to believe that responsibility is 
insufficient as the basis of a just health care distribution, and therefore must be replaced with 
something like RA. For these reasons I suggest a modified (and quite demanding) version of RA: 
Justice does not require society to bear the costs (health-care costs or general costs) stemming 
from a behavior, X, iff: 
a) Individuals are responsible for X 
b) X, generally speaking, leads to higher costs (health care or general) than non-X 
c) We do not have other relevant reasons to find it unreasonable to expect individuals to 
avoid X (such as our reasons to find it unreasonable to expect women in general not to get 
pregnant) 
It remains to be asked whether Segall could justify his version of RA by giving up his premise of 
non-paternalism. I do not think so (though I do not otherwise believe we should avoid 
paternalism). Suppose individuals are not responsible for smoking. This would not mean that (e.g.) 
raising the tobacco-prizes will not result in less tobacco-consumption – ceteris paribus, which 
therefore may be a pro tanto reason in fact to raise them.100 But not all smokers will quit or smoke 
less, when the prize goes up. If such a paternalistic motive was included in RA, it would follow that 
we do not have justice-based reasons to treat smoking-related diseases, even though smokers are 
not responsible for smoking.  
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For similar reasons I believe attempts to allow for sentence-type B ultimately fail. I acknowledge 
that there might be certain situations, when we would appeal to something like reasonability 
without responsibility. But this would be cases of exception, typically cases of necessary incentive 
regulation. Consider, as Segall does101, something like China’s one-child policy in case of increased 
population. In such case we may want to appeal to reasonability regarding how many children 
couples get. Contrary to Segall, however, I believe it would be a conceptual mistake to include 
such reasonability-appeal in RA. Suppose a woman ends up pregnant without being responsible 
for it (due to rape, say). If RA allows for sentence-type B, it follows that we do not have justice-
based reasons to support her birth-giving. Paternalistic policies and other policies of incentive 
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Obesity and personal responsibility102 





What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for overweight or obesity? This 
question is of paramount importance for an ethical assessment of current and future practices of 
health care, public health programs etc. Philosophers working on the question of responsibility 
disagree on what it ultimately takes for an individual to be responsible. We examine three basic 
approaches to responsibility and spell out what it takes for a person, according to each of the 
approaches, to be responsible for obesity. We show that only one of them – what we call the 
naturalistic approach – can accommodate some widely shared intuitions to the effect that much 
causal influences on obesity, such as genetics or certain social circumstances, diminishes or even 
completely undermines personal responsibility. However, accepting this naturalistic approach most 
likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject some widely 
shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or -undermining, or accept that 
there is no personal responsibility – for obesity or, for that matter, anything. Finally, we briefly 
elaborate on the political implications of the latter alternative.   
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Introduction and conceptual clarification 
Imagine that you are a member of an ethical advisory board, giving advice and guidance to a big 
hospital. An eccentric billionaire decides to donate a very large sum of money to the hospital on 
the following condition: either the money goes into a new ward specializing in treatment of 
obesity-related diabetes, or it goes into treatment for some congenital disease. Imagine, 
moreover, that apart from questions of personal responsibility, there are no morally relevant 
differences between the expected outcomes of either alternative: expected increases in welfare, 
whether one thinks in terms of DALY’s, QALY’s, longevity, ICER’s etc. are the same. Long term costs 
are the same etc. Clearly, one is not responsible for being born with a congenital disease. But it 
might be the case that (some) obese diabetics are wholly, or partly, personally responsible for 
their condition. Does that make a difference? Many would probably be inclined to opt for the 
second option because they see the question of personal responsibility as a tie-breaker: when we 
can choose between benefitting those who under no circumstances are responsible, and those 
who are responsible, we should opt for helping those who for sure have no personal responsibility 
for their plight. We want to argue that, ultimately, questions of personal responsibility should not 
count morally, because they rest on implausible claims. 
Many believe that most individuals are personally responsible when being overweight or obese.103 
(Obesity, we use the term obesity to cover the relevant cases from now on, is taken to be one of 
the “grand challenges” of the near and long term future which is one of the reasons why we want 
to focus on that.104 However, our discussion can easily be applied to other “life-style related” 
diseases that correlate with, e.g., consumption of tobacco or alcohol, or with a sedentary life). 
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Many also believe that when an individual is responsible for some unfortunate state of affairs, 
then society does not owe that individual compensation for this unfortunate state of affairs. This 
view is namely well-founded in the theory of luck egalitarianism105, and quite a few laypersons 
seem to agree.106 However, few are probably ready to accept the implications of that line of 
reasoning. If both assumptions are correct, then the ideal of equal free access to health care may 
be challenged: If some persons are responsible for their own health, and we do not owe such 
persons a duty of compensation, then persons that suffer as a consequence of their (ex hypothesis 
self-chosen) obesity (or any other such self-chosen condition) do not have a (justice-based) right 
to free health care. 
But most persons are probably inclined to say that an individual is, for the most part, at least 
partially responsible for his or her habits and behavior as regards diet, exercise and other relevant 
aspects of obesity. To wit, ten Have et al. write: 
Overweight is the result of a complex web of causal factors, many of which are outside 
the individual’s control. It is partly the result of personal and voluntary choices, and 
partly the result of social and environmental characteristics.107 
We venture that many scholars in the field of bioethics, medical philosophy, public health ethics 
and related areas hold some such “mixed” conception of responsibility. Hence, many discussions 
of just access to health care, allocation of resources etc. have a decidedly “luck egalitarian” slant: 
they focus on questions of choice and circumstances, and then proceed to a discussion of social 
justice relying, roughly at least, on the luck egalitarian intuition that we ought to hold persons 
accountable for their choices, but not their circumstances. In principle, we have no problems with 
that account. But we want to go into the moral philosophical discussion about responsibility rather 
than the political philosophical one to show just how troublesome it is to argue for the possibility 
of personal responsibility in the first place. This is of course compatible with a number of other 
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reasons (reasons apart from the issue of personal responsibility) to hold different people 
accountable in various ways. But we postpone that discussion to the final section. 
We also venture that many (if not most) scholars hold the classic view that free will is what makes 
us responsible. Hence, Glannon argues that, even though most of us are causally influenced by 
various external factors (for which we cannot be responsible), we are able to causally influence 
outcomes, and this suffices for at least some forms of moral responsibility.108 But even Glannon 
admits that there are cases (of acting, e.g., drinking heavily) where outside causal factors are so 
strong that responsibility is undermined. Thus, those who rely on an affirmative view of personal 
responsibility often admit that responsibility can be undermined by certain causal factors.  
Indeed, many factors do seem to soften, or even completely undermine, the assumption that 
individuals are responsible for overweight or obesity: For instance, it seems that having obese 
parents is the largest predictor of childhood obesity109, and it seems indeed wrong to say that 
children are responsible for choosing their parents. Many other factors – for which the individual 
hardly can be responsible – are suggested in the literature, ranging from genetic and epigenetic 
factors over mental illnesses and addiction to cultural, economic and advertising issues.110 We 
shall later return to what we call “the naturalistic approach” to responsibility as the only plausible 
candidate for explaining why such factors should count as responsibility-undermining, and draw 
the – perhaps surprising – implications of adopting this view. For now, note the widespread 
assumption (or intuition) that these factors can undermine responsibility.  
Our main aim in this article is therefore to lay out what seems to be the three basic approaches to 
responsibility, philosophically speaking:111 First what we call a naturalistic approach112, secondly 
true identity, and last reason-responsiveness. These are different fundamental theories of what 
responsibility ultimately requires. To illustrate the implications of each of them we introduce a 
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made-up obese person, Sam, and show what it takes, according to each of these theories, for Sam 
to be responsible for being obese. 
Our main claim is as follows: insofar one is inclined to accept that, e.g., genetic make-up, 
childhood conditioning, social-economic status or many others of the standard factors that are 
suggested to undermine responsibility really do undermine responsibility then the naturalistic 
approach provides the only plausible explanation. In other words, accepting a range of 
responsibility-undermining factors goes hand in hand with the naturalistic approach. However, the 
most plausible rendering of the naturalistic approach leads to a denial of the possibility of 
personal responsibility. Hence, if one accepts that, e.g., having a certain genetic make-up, or 
having a strongly obesogenic social background, or some combination thereof, does undermine 
personal responsibility (wholly or partially) then one should probably accept that personal 
responsibility is, at the end of the day, impossible in general. 
Overview of the argument to follow  
First, we will lay out what we call the naturalistic approach to responsibility. This approach 
essentially requires Sam to be the very cause of the obesity in order for Sam to be responsible for 
it. More precisely, Sam is responsible if Sam 1) is able to do otherwise, i.e. not to overeat, and 2) if 
Sam is responsible for the causes of overeating. These requirements cannot be satisfied in a world 
of determinism or quantum mechanics, but depend on the truth of agent-causality. We argue that 
agent-causality, understood in a way that satisfies these requirements, is implausible. Therefore, 
we will not only conclude that Sam most likely is not responsible for being obese, but more 
generally that Sam most likely cannot be responsible for anything.  
Second, we present the true identity-approach to responsibility, which for Sam to be responsible 
requires a “mesh” (roughly, an overlap) between Sam’s first order desires, e.g. to overeat, and 
Sam’s second order volition, which is who Sam really wants to be.113 Thus, Sam is responsible for 
being obese to the extent Sam identifies with those actions that lead to obesity. A brief look at the 
market for diets makes it most likely that Sam is not responsible for Sam’s obesity, given Sam’s 
second-order volitions are similar to those held by most people. However, as some obese 
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individuals may in fact identify with those of their actions that lead to obesity, the conclusion here 
is rather that some obese individuals are responsible whereas others are not.  
Third, we present the reason-responsiveness-approach to responsibility, which for Sam to be 
responsible requires Sam to be appropriately sensitive to reasons when acting in ways that lead to 
obesity.114 We conclude that, on this account, it is most likely that Sam is responsible for behaviors 
leading to obesity, barring extreme cases. However, as regards the two latter, so-called 
compatibilistic, approaches, we shall note some outstanding difficulties which provide good 
reasons to be at least somewhat skeptical about their cogency.  
Fourth, we show what kind of empirical findings that may soften or undermine responsibility 
according to each of the three approaches. We argue that insofar one is inclined to find it 
responsibility-softening, or undermining, when, e.g. social epidemiological studies suggest 
different social circumstances to have a causal impact on obesity rates, or knowledge about 
genetic determinants of obesity reveals a connection between genes and obesity, then it is very 
likely that we already have the intuition that the naturalistic approach is what responsibility 
requires. Responsibility, according to the two latter approaches, is namely not really threatened by 
such findings. So if we hold the intuition that one of the two is what responsibility requires, then 
we cannot justify holding such findings in social epidemiology or genetics to be responsibility-
undermining. Moreover, if we do find such findings to be responsibility-undermining, then, given 
the implausibility of individuals’ ability to make ultimately free choices, we most likely ought to 
conclude that personal responsibility for obesity, or anything at all, is impossible.      
Sixth and finally, we will briefly elaborate on some implications of this conclusion. Whether 
individuals such as Sam are responsible for obesity in the way discussed here is namely only one 
potential matter when considering whether and to which extent we ought to hold individuals 
accountable (i.e., cost-wise) for behaviors leading to obesity. There might be other factors beyond 
personal responsibility that pertain to that matter. 
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1: The naturalistic approach to responsibility 
In our daily practices it seems natural that we hold each other responsible for our actions, 
including at least some of our ‘lifestyle characteristics’. Suppose our test person, Sam, complains 
about being obese at some get-together over coffee, and then reaches out for a third piece of 
cake. Ignoring reasons of politeness, nothing seems more obvious than to ask: “why don’t you just 
leave it?” Perhaps we recognize that Sam may find it difficult to overcome the desire to eat a cake, 
but nonetheless we assume that the possibility to act (or do) differently is within Sam’s control. 
However, if we allow ourselves to ask why Sam eats this third piece of cake it is not very obvious 
that Sam in fact can act differently. Consider Galen Strawson’s “basic argument”:  
(1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early 
experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in 
any way responsible (morally or otherwise).  
(2) One cannot in any later stage of life hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way 
one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and previous 
experience. 
(3) For both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree 
of one’s success in one’s attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a 
result of heredity and previous experience.  
(4) And any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain 
initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous 
experience.115 
Now if we ask why Sam eats the third piece of cake, it seems that whatever cause we will find to 
explain it will itself be an effect of another cause, which also will be an effect of a cause and so 
forth. We will soon realize that when Sam is eating the third piece of cake it is the result of a chain 
of causes and effects involving not just Sam’s earlier experiences, but in fact events and states 
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before Sam was born, such as genes and epigenetic influences. Sam simply eats the third piece of 
cake due to reasons that are ultimately beyond Sam’s control, and, similarly, if Sam changes 
eating-behavior and somehow manage to eat less cake, it would also be due to reasons that are 
ultimately beyond Sam’s control. How could Sam, or anyone else, ever be responsible for that? 
However, it may be too hasty to assume that every change in the way Sam behaves is necessarily 
causally determined by earlier events. Strawson therefore continues:  
(5) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are 
traceable not to heredity and experience but to the influence of indeterministic or random 
factors. But it is absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is 
ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute in any way to one’s being 
truly morally responsible for how one is.116 
So the point is this: every change in Sam, and in the world for that matter, is either determined by 
previous causes or random factors. But, as Strawson points out, it is absurd to suppose that 
something completely random – think of something like a quantum leap – can be linked to 
someone’s responsibility, since, if something is completely random, it is beyond anyone’s control.  
Following the argument of Strawson, the point is that Sam must be the very cause of eating the 
cake in order to be responsible for it. But how can that be the case? 
The naturalistic approach to responsibility can be expressed in two formal requirements: 
 
A person P is responsible for an act (or omission), X, only if: 
 
1) P had the ability to do otherwise, that is not to perform X (the ability to do 
otherwise- requirement).117 
 
If every event in the world is determined by prior causes, then Sam can never do otherwise. 
However, we do not know if every event in the world is determined by prior causes. There may 
simply be random factors. If this is so, then Sam may have had the ability to do otherwise. But we 
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are not looking for the ability to do otherwise due to random factors – we want Sam, not some 
random factors, to be the very cause of the action. We are looking for Sam’s self-determination, 
and we therefore need a second requirement: 
 
2) P is responsible for the causes of X (regression-requirement).118 
 
Combining the ability to do otherwise-requirement with the regression-requirement, we cannot 
ascribe responsibility to Sam in cases where Sam could have done otherwise, but only due to 
random factors. If Sam’s choices and actions are determined or random, then Sam cannot be 
responsible. This seems indeed intuitively plausible, and if this is so, then responsibility begins to 
look impossible. However, there is one alternative remaining that may make responsibility 
possible given our two requirements. This is the possibility of agent-causality. Just like God in 
theology has been assumed to be the cause of everything without being caused by anything we 
ought to consider whether individuals (agents) can act in such ways. 
 
Agent-causality is simply the view that agents are able to start new causal chains that are neither 
pre-determined nor completely random. This, we may say, corresponds to a naturalistic concept 
of free will. To choose something as a matter of free will would ultimately require that we choose 
it freely such that it is neither random nor caused by previous events. If the ability to do otherwise-
requirement and the regression-requirement is what it takes for an agent to be responsible, and 
agent-causality is true, then responsibility is possible: Agent-causality would allow for Sam to be 
responsible for eating the cake, since Sam can start – in a non-arbitrary manner – new causal 
chains, which satisfies the ability to do otherwise-requirement. And if Sam’s cake-eating is in fact 
an agent-causal performance, then there is no further causality regression – Sam is the very cause 
of the cake-eating, and the regression-requirement is therefore satisfied. Hence, Sam is 
responsible for eating the cake.    
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However, agent-causality is highly contestable and no one seems to have given any fully 
satisfactory explanation of how it is supposed to work.119 It is of course difficult, if not impossible, 
to demonstrate the falsity of agent-causality, but following a method of inference to the best 
explanation, agent-causality is probably ruled out. Let us try to illustrate the problem: 
 
If Sam eats five high fat cakes as an agent-causal performance it follows that there is no further 
causal explanation as for why Sam did so other than Sam doing so: Sam did it, and that is the 
cause. But this seems to be a complete denial of the very strong and wide-spread intuition that 
events, including human acts, happens for causal reasons (or, if we allow for quantum mechanics, 
random factors). If Sam eats five cakes, it seems, in light of our general scientific worldview, to be 
a rather unsatisfying explanation just to say that Sam ate the cakes because Sam did so. Few 
would probably agree that Sam’s decision to eat five cakes has no further causal explanations, 
such as psychological conditions and social circumstances.  
However, agent-causal performances may occur even if it is true that Sam eating five cakes was 
affected by other factors, such as psychological conditions, social circumstances and so on. This, 
we may believe, does not exclude the possibility that Sam has a free choice in the following sense: 
For each event in Sam’s life we may admit that Sam is affected by these factors, but still insist that 
Sam faces a set of options in which Sam can make a radical free choice. However, even though this 
explanation is partly compatible with causal explanations, it does not escape the problem of 
explaining why Sam chooses as Sam does. It only minimizes the scope of the problem. Per 
definition, agent-causal performances cannot have any causal explanation, and therefore agent-
causality is incompatible with any scientific causal explanation of human behavior, whether 
psychological, sociological or biological. 
Thus, agent-causality is probably false. This does not mean that we do not make choices, but 
rather that our choices are the result of random factors or causes that are linked to circumstances 
ultimately beyond our control. The conclusion that responsibility is impossible, however, is very 
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radical. It does not only imply that Sam is not responsible for increased risk of various diseases due 
to intense cake-eating, but also that rapists and corrupt businessmen are not responsible for their 
criminal choices. But while the conclusion is difficult to avoid, it is only valid if it is true that 
responsibility requires causality-regression and the ability to do otherwise. But, as we shall see in 
the following, this is contestable too.   
2: The true identity approach to responsibility  
The philosophical landscape of responsibility is divided between incompatibilists who claim that 
responsibility is impossible if determinism is true and compatibilists who claim that responsibility 
is in some way, to be further specified, compatible with determinism. However, as we have seen 
from Strawson’s basic argument, the mere existence of indeterministic factors does not help much 
if one would want to vindicate personal responsibility. Only self-determination – an agent’s ability 
to do otherwise in a way that is within his or her control – does the trick. Nonetheless we now turn 
to the first of two such compatibilistic arguments – the true identity approach. 
The fact that Sam is eating the cake is probably determined by heredity and earlier experiences, 
and perhaps also random factors. Unless agent-causality is possible, Sam is therefore never able to 
do otherwise in such a way that satisfies the regression requirement. But we may challenge the 
very claim that the ability to do otherwise is what responsibility requires, and that is what Harry 
Frankfurt famously has done. Here is the structure of his famous example in our re-writing: 
Suppose the owners of some fast food restaurant chain, C, wants Sam to continue to eat their 
rather unhealthy food. They employ an unusually excellent brain surgeon, Black, who is able to 
manipulate Sam’s brain-processes and the owners of C wants Black to do anything to make sure 
that Sam continues to buy and eat their food at a daily basis. The next day, however, Sam decides 
to go and dine at C. But had Sam not decided go and dine at C, Black would have manipulated 
Sam’s brain so that Sam would have decided to do so. Therefore, Sam dines at C, but could not 
have done otherwise. Yet, Frankfurt claims, Sam is responsible for dining at C, since Sam acted in 
correspondence with what Sam really wanted to do.120   
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Intuitively we may therefore tend to think that it is irrelevant whether Sam actually could have 
done otherwise, since it seems that even if Sam could have done otherwise, Sam would still have 
dined at C. We may therefore tend to think that a hypothetical choice – “What would Sam really 
like to have done?” – is what responsibility requires.     
Frankfurt thus provide us with a different concept of responsibility according to which the ability 
to do otherwise is irrelevant. Whether there are previous causes as for why we act as we do is 
irrelevant. Instead, he argues, responsibility requires a correspondence between a person’s first 
order desire and second order volition, which is a second order desire that one wishes should 
constitute one’s will – or one’s “true identity”.121  
Suppose Sam is an over-eater. Then Sam has a first order desire to (over)-eat, at least occasionally. 
However, imagine furthermore that Sam also has a second order desire not to overeat, e.g. 
because Sam is aware of the evidence of harmful effects. Furthermore, Sam wishes that this 
second order desire should constitute Sam’s will, and Sam therefore has a second order volition 
not to desire to over-eat. According to Frankfurt, then, Sam is not responsible for over-eating, 
since if Sam could simply choose then Sam would choose not to over-eat. There is a conflict 
between what Sam does, and who Sam really wants to be; a conflict between effective desires and 
desired will or identity. 
Now let us compare Sam to Vick, who, let us assume, similarly is an over-eater, and therefore 
similarly has a first order desire to over-eat. However, contrary to Sam, Vick has a second order 
volition in fact to desire to over-eat, which means that even if Vick actually and freely could 
choose not to over-eat, then Vick would still choose to over-eat. According to Frankfurt, Vick is 
therefore responsible for over-eating. To over-eat, Frankfurt would claim, corresponds to who Vick 
really is, to Vick’s true identity.  
Frankfurt’s approach to responsibility has been subject to criticism.122 If everything Vick does is a 
result of either random factors or heredity and earlier experiences, then it seems obvious to ask 
whether what Vick hypothetically would choose – e.g. to over-eat even if the choice not to over-
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eat really is available – is not also a result of either random factors or heredity and earlier 
experiences, and hence beyond responsibility.123 It definitely seems so, so if Frankfurt is correct, 
then responsibility is bound to our hypothetical choices, our identities, and the causes of our 
identities are ultimately irrelevant. But this seems counter-intuitive, or so we maintain.    
However, if we, despite the objection, accept this approach to responsibility, and implement it 
politically, then we should note that even though it becomes possible to ascribe responsibility to 
some individuals it hardly implies that individuals in general are responsible for over-eating (or 
other factors of obesity). Rather, it seems, over-eating is characterized by something that most 
individuals aim to suppress – just look at the market for diets. If this is so, then the taste for over-
eating is one with which over-eaters do not in general identify, and to that extent it is therefore 
comparable to an unchosen handicap for which one is not responsible.124  
3: The reason-responsiveness approach to responsibility 
Another compatibilistic approach to responsibility focuses on whether an agent is appropriately 
responsive to reasons. There are several advocates of such an approach, but John Martin Fischer’s 
version(s) seems to be the most developed one. Fischer shares the intuition behind Frankfurt’s 
case in the sense that he also holds that Sam is – ceteris paribus – responsible for dining at C. His 
account, however, is different.  
In Fischer’s later work he joins partnership with Mark Ravizza. They state that in order for an agent 
to be responsible for an action two conditions must be satisfied. The first condition is the 
“epistemic condition”: An agent must know the particular facts surrounding his action and act with 
the proper sort of beliefs and intentions in order to be responsible.125 When it comes to obesity 
the obese agent must know, e.g., that there is a causal connection between what (and how much) 
one eats and one’s body weight.  
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The second condition is the “freedom-relevant condition”. To satisfy this condition an agent must 
act from a mechanism that is the agent’s own reasons-responsive mechanism.126 This requirement 
leads to two questions: 1) what does it take for a mechanism to be reason-responsive? And 2) 
what does it take for a mechanism to be the agent’s own?  
1) Mechanisms that are reason-responsive are sensitive to rational considerations, whereas non-
reason-responsive mechanisms are not: They are merely physical processes such as those in the 
central nervous system.127 A mechanism is reason-responsive insofar the agent acting upon it 
would have responded differently in at least some circumstances in which the relevant reasons 
were different. An agent is reason-responsive if the mechanism on which he or she acts would in 
some possible world, in which there is reason to do otherwise, lead him or her to act on that 
reason, and hence do otherwise.128 This should not be confused with any requirement of the 
actual ability to do otherwise. The point is merely that the agent’s responsiveness in some 
counterfactual situations (possible worlds) is evidence that the mechanism upon which the agent 
acts is reason-responsive.  
So let us go back to our coffee-get-together, where Sam is reaching out for a third piece of cake 
despite sufficient reason not to (Sam is obese and does not want to be so). Sam is reason-
responsive if there is some possible world where relevant facts are different and where Sam 
would act differently. This seems easy to imagine. Suppose we promised Sam a million dollars if 
Sam refrains from eating the next cake. Sam would then most likely not eat the next cake, and 
therefore Sam is sensitive to at least some incentives (reasons) not to eat the next cake. The 
mechanism upon which Sam acts is therefore reason-responsive. If, on the other hand, Black, our 
brain surgeon, had manipulated Sam’s brain processes so that Sam no matter what would reach 
out for and eat the next cake, then the mechanism operating would not be reason-responsive.   
This may seem to be a much too permissive requirement. The mechanism upon which we act is 
almost always reason-responsive in this counterfactual way, since we are generally sensitive to 
some possible incentive to act differently. For instance, most would probably refrain from 
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ascribing responsibility to a kleptomaniac, since we regard such a person to have a mental 
disorder when it comes to stealing. A kleptomaniac, we would say, is not reason-responsive, but 
suffers from a mental dysfunction. However, it is conceivable that even a kleptomaniac is reason-
responsive if the incentive-pressure is strong enough. Even a kleptomaniac may refrain from 
stealing if he or she was convinced that God would punish mankind with a new flood if he or she 
did just a banal performance of shoplifting.129 
In any event, the freedom-relevant condition for responsibility has a second requirement, namely 
that the reason-responsive mechanism is the agent’s own:  
2) Fischer and Ravizza ask us to imagine a scientist who secretly implants a mechanism in Judith’s 
brain a few days ago. Employing this mechanism, the scientist electronically stimulates Judith’s 
brain in such a way as to create a desire that is not literally irresistible, but nevertheless extremely 
strong, to punch her best friend Jane the next time she sees her. The desire is so strong that Judith 
would punch Jane under every possible circumstance except one in which she knows that if she 
were to punch Jane, she would thereby cause the deaths of a large number of innocent people.130 
Intuitively most would tend to think, we guess, that Judith is not responsible for punching Jane 
even though the mechanism upon which she acts is reason-responsive. But she is not responsible, 
Fischer and Ravizza maintains, because the mechanism upon which she acts is not her own.  
Therefore, it is not enough that the mechanisms upon which we act are reason-responsive, they 
must also be our own, and this is only the case if we ‘take responsibility’ for them. For Fischer and 
Ravizza this involves three ingredients:  
(…) the individual must see himself as an agent: he must see that his choices and 
actions are efficacious in the world.  
Second, the individual must accept that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as 
a result of how he exercises his agency in certain contexts (…), and that it is not an 
arbitrary matter what those contexts are.  
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(Third), the individuals view of himself specified in the first two conditions be based, 
in an appropriate way, on the evidence. (…) For example, the child’s view of himself 
as an agent needs to be based (in an appropriate way) on his experience with the 
effects of his choices and actions on the world.131 
So how does this help us when considering whether individuals are responsible for overeating 
etc.? Is Sam responsible when eating cake? This is most likely so: First, Sam (most likely) knows 
about the consequences of the relevant actions. Second, the mechanism Sam is acting upon is 
(most likely) reason-responsive (Sam would probably not eat the cake if we promised Sam a 
million dollars), and third, we can reasonably assume that Sam satisfies the requirement of the 
mechanism being one’s own: Sam most likely sees the relevant actions as efficacious in the world 
and assumes the role of being a fair target of reactive attitudes. In other words, it seems that, 
barring some quite unusual cases, individuals are responsible for over-eating and other acts or 
omissions that lead to obesity.132  
However, there are weighty reasons to remain skeptical about the plausibility of this 
conceptualization of responsibility. Even if one accepts that the reason-responsive-approach 
contains many interesting insights, Fischer and Ravizza’s theory is subject to some important and 
substantial rejoinders.  
First, basing responsibility in the real world on the mere “fact” that an agent would have 
responded differently in some possible world seems in some cases to be rather outré. What does 
it really prove if a heroin-addict would have responded differently in some possible world and not 
taken the next fix because he or she were convinced that his or her entire family would be 
tortured and killed if he or she took the fix? If this suggestion is true, then it implies that the 
heroin-addict is reason-responsive, even if he or she is, in this world, almost completely unable to 
control his or her addiction.  
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Second, while it seems right when Fischer and Ravizza require the reason-responsive mechanism 
to be the agent’s own, one may plausibly ask what follows from this. In daily practices, most of us 
see ourselves as agents and accept that we, at least to some extent, are fair targets of reactive 
attitudes such as blame and criticism – we do see and acknowledge that our choices and actions 
are efficacious in the world, and we do know that over-eating, lack of exercise etc. are unhealthy 
habits. By having these habits, we are thus responsible, according to Fischer and Ravizza. But there 
seems to be quite a few missed factors here, such as socio-economic and cultural circumstances or 
commercial influences that strike us as being responsibility-undermining, or at least responsibility-
softening. If Sam grew up in a family of obese parents, where fatty cakes and junk food were the 
dishes of the day, these circumstances seem to be relevant for responsibility even though Sam’s 
cake indulgence issues from Sam’s own reason-responsive mechanism.133 Even though one might 
readily admit that Sam’s brain is Sam’s brain, does it really follow that Sam is ultimately 
responsible for the ways in which Sam’s ability to respond to reasons is formed? Fischer and 
Ravizza do not pay adequate attention to such factors.    
Before proceeding to the matter of empirical evidence, we want briefly to comment on a 
structural problem that is shared by both the true identity- and the reason responsiveness 
approach. In essence, they can be said to be a-historic views of personal responsibility. Roughly, 
for the former, what matters is the match or mismatch between an agent’s deeply held 
preferences (“identity”) and first-order desires, and not the way in which this identity and these 
desires arose in the first place. For the latter, what matters is whether or not an agent would have 
responded differently to a counterfactual set of relevant reasons, and the history of the reasons-
responsive mechanism is only captured by the requirement of the reason-responsive mechanism 
to be the agents’ own. This a-historic tactic is probably necessary to avoid being entangled in a 
regress which will inevitably point back to some set of causal factors for which no individual can be 
responsible. However, it is also a weak spot in both theories, for it seems weird to ignore the past 
in an assessment of whether or not a given individual is responsible for his or her preferences, 
identity, or reason-responsiveness. 
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4: Empirical evidence and responsibility 
As we have seen, personal responsibility is a very complex concept. As we hope to have shown, it 
is unclear what exactly it requires for an individual to be responsible in general; whether one can 
ever fulfill those requirements, and therefore also whether an individual can ever be responsible 
for behaviors leading to obesity. Part of our motivation for writing this article was that we asked 
ourselves what would count as evidence for the proposition that individuals are not responsible 
for their obesity. Obviously, this varies from one responsibility-approach to another. In turn: 
Reason-Responsiveness: Starting from the latter approach, reason-responsiveness, we find three 
requirements that obese individuals may be shown not to satisfy.  
First, the epistemic notion: An agent must know the particular facts surrounding his or her action 
and act with the proper sort of beliefs and intentions in order to be responsible. Considering the 
information-level of most citizens of the western world today, it is tempting to conclude that 
obese individuals are aware of the potential harmful effects of over-eating and lack of exercise. It 
seems implausible to postulate that individuals generally are not aware that green salads are 
healthier than deep fried chicken, or that there is a connection between exercise and body-mass. 
However, the question is to which extent this is actually true? Strikingly, 90% of Americans 
describe their diet as either “extremely”, “very” or “somewhat” healthy134, and therefore this is of 
course open for empirical investigations. 
Second, the requirement of reason-responsiveness: it seems that as for the part of obesity that is 
brought about by inappropriate diets and lack of exercise, we all respond to reasons, at least 
counterfactually, in the way envisioned by Fischer and Ravizza. It is easy to imagine various 
incentives that would make us act differently when we face choices of how and when to eat and 
exercise. It is therefore hard to imagine evidence suggesting that we do not satisfy the 
requirement of being responsive to reasons.   
Third, the requirement of the reason-responsive mechanism involves that individuals must see 
their choices and actions as efficacious in the world, and accept that they are themselves fair 
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targets of reactive attitudes. Again, if an individual is aware of the causal connection between 
eating patterns and body weight, then he or she most likely also sees his or her actions as 
efficacious and acknowledges that he or she, at least in some weak sense, is a fair target of 
reactive attitudes.  
Most interestingly, since the requirement of reason-responsiveness is bound to counter-factual 
scenarios, even massive evidence of causal connections between, e.g., social circumstances or 
psychological dispositions and eating and exercising habits would not count as evidence against 
responsibility for obesity. If some combination of Sam’s psychological and genetic disposition and 
social circumstances is the cause of Sam’s eating- and exercise behaviors, and therefore Sam’s 
obesity, then it is still possible that Sam is both very well aware of the connection between 
behavior and obesity, and is responding properly to reasons when behaving in these ways. Even if 
Sam is completely determined to do what Sam does, Sam may still possess the required 
knowledge and be reason-responsive. For many, including the authors of this article, this seems 
wrong. 
True Identity: Even massive evidence of causal connections or “pre-determinants” would not 
count as evidence against responsibility for obesity if the true identity approach is correct. This 
approach focuses exclusively on the connection between the individual’s first order desires and 
second order volitions, and therefore the only evidence against responsibility would be if 
individuals are shown not to identify with those of their behaviors that lead to obesity. Such 
evidence may be found. We believe, however, that only very few obese persons truly identify with 
their (over)eating desires, and if so then they are not responsible, according to the true identity-
approach. 
The Naturalistic Approach: If we accept the naturalistic approach to responsibility, then agent-
causality needs to be true in order for responsibility to be possible. Agent-causality, however, 
seems very hard to defend, though it also seems close to impossible to prove wrong.  
But even though we cannot do so, it seems plausible to assume that a method of inference to the 
best explanation rules it out. Our scientific worldview is massively bound to the intuition that 
everything happens for a causal reason, and even if there are naturalistic processes that are 
probabilistic rather than determined, as suggested by the theory of quantum mechanics, it would, 
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as we have shown, not provide evidence for agent-causality. Furthermore, it is far from clear that 
we need the concept of agent-causality in order to explain how humans operate, whether we talk 
about biology, history or psychology. Most likely, the concept would make our basic theories 
unnecessarily more complicated without enabling us to predict more outcomes. Applying 
Ockham’s razor undermines faith in agent-causality.  
However, modern science is far from able to predict all human behaviors – especially not at an 
individual level. Are we really justified in ignoring the possibility of the existence of agent-causal 
performances? Perhaps this is not for us to conclude. But if so, then note that concrete evidence, 
as when having obese parents is shown to be a significant predictor of obesity135, gives us reason 
to believe that even if agent-causality is true, then the obese person is not the only cause of 
obesity. This of course presupposes that the significant statistical correlation between obesity and 
having obese parents implies a causal connection, but this seems otherwise plausible. Therefore, 
the more such evidence we are able to provide, the smaller is the scope for potential agent-causal 
performances.   
That aside, our general point is this: we believe that there is a widespread intuition that concrete 
evidence (such as strong statistical correlations, social, genetic, or otherwise) of causal influences 
on obesity is in fact responsibility-undermining. To wit Brownell. et al. write: 
Taken together, a great many studies have identified factors in the modern food 
environment that compromise or even hijack biological and psychological regulatory 
systems that govern eating and weight. These forces make it difficult to be 
“responsible.” (…) 
 
Research on the determinants of smoking, exercising, and eating behavior reveals 
that these are not simply free and independent choices by individuals, but rather are 
influenced by powerful environmental factors.136 
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But insofar we do hold this intuition that concrete evidence (such as strong statistical correlations, 
social, genetic, or otherwise) of causal influences on obesity is responsibility-undermining, then – 
looking at the available options, as for what responsibility requires – this intuition can only be 
justified by the naturalistic approach. The other available approaches do simply not concern 
causality, and are therefore insensitive to such findings. Therefore conversely: if we deny the 
naturalistic approach to responsibility, then we cannot justify any intuitions to the effect that such 
causal influences count as responsibility-undermining. In that case we need to ignore such 
intuitions – something, we assume, few are really prepared to do. The intuition that responsibility 
can be undermined by genetic or social circumstances is simply too convincing to be scrapped.    
We can therefore conclude that insofar we do hold the intuition that concrete evidence of causal 
influences on obesity is responsibility-undermining, then, given the improbability of agent-
causality, we ought to take seriously the plausibility of the impossibility of responsibility. Needless 
to say, therefore we should also be open to the suggestion that there is no personal responsibility 
for obesity.   
5: Implications, political relevance, and conclusion 
In this article we have attempted to outline what seem to be the three fundamental approaches to 
moral responsibility and looked at their implications for the question of personal moral 
responsibility for obesity. The most plausible rendering of the naturalistic approach seems to 
make moral responsibility impossible. According to the true identity approach, only very few obese 
persons should be labeled as morally responsible because, we assume, very few identify truly with 
behaviors leading to obesity. Most accommodating of the belief that the obese person is morally 
responsible is the reasons-responsiveness approach. But, as we also have argued, this approach 
seems over-inclusive on many counts, and not ultimately convincing. Finally, we have argued that 
if one believes that factors beyond the individual’s control, such as genetics or social 
circumstances can indeed soften or undermine responsibility, then the naturalistic account is the 
most, or indeed the only, plausible account of responsibility catering to that intuition. However, 
accepting the naturalistic approach makes personal responsibility very, very hard to defend in the 
first place. We wish therefore very briefly to follow up on some of the implications of the 
impossibility of responsibility in order to suggest further lines of enquiry.  
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Even though there is no logical or necessary connection between on one hand moral responsibility 
and, on the other, holding individuals responsible in terms of moral criticism, praise, blame, or 
cost-responsibility, a very influential theory of justice in the contemporary political philosophical 
debate – luck egalitarianism – holds, roughly, that inequalities are unjust except when they “track 
choice” – implying that it is only if we are indeed responsible for an outcome that we can be held 
cost-responsible, ceteris paribus137, and quite a few laypersons seem to agree.138 Following this 
theory, if the obese are not responsible, then eventual inequalities stemming from their obesity 
are indeed unjust – at least ceteris paribus. However, this latter clause is important, since there 
might be other reasons that could justify holding the obese cost-responsible. One key candidate 
here is efficiency: if it is indeed efficient, in terms of e.g. decreasing obesity rates (ultimately: in 
terms of aggregated welfare) to hold persons cost-responsible, then we are perhaps justified in 
doing so. Holding the obese cost-responsible may be done e.g. by imposing consumer taxes on 
fatty food, or, perhaps less sympathetic, self-payment on certain health care services related to 
obesity.   
This raises three further sets of questions. First, is it efficient to hold individuals cost-responsible 
for consequences of obesity – does it forestall or reduce obesity, and does it do so in a way, which 
is better, all things considered, than other alternatives? Second, at what price to other values, 
such as personal autonomy, equal respect etc. can society pursue policies that hold the obese 
cost-responsible?139 Third, given the starting point that the obese most likely are not morally 
responsible, how can society pursue such policies in ways that do not stigmatize the obese; 
policies that do not carry the message “you are to blame” even if it does hold them cost-
responsible? 
We believe all three lines of enquiry should be of great interest to scientists and scholars engaged 
with the question of obesity. They call both for justified theories of distributional justice, for a 
closer examination of public health interventions, and for extended empirical investigations.   
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What does society owe me if I am worse off due to my own responsibility?140  
 




The luck egalitarian literature offers many sophisticated discussions on how to understand the 
notion of responsibility, choice or option luck, and thus when more precisely it is (or is not) unjust 
for an individual to be worse off than others. But it does not offer any answer to the question of 
what more precisely the self-responsible worse off individual ought to be held cost-responsible for? 
In this article I discuss two parallel questions: 1) if an individual is worse off than others due to her 
own responsibility then what benefits, if any, does society have justice-based reasons to provide 
her? And 2) if an individual is worse off than others due to her own responsibility, then what 
benefits, if any, does society have justice-based reasons to hold that individual (uniquely) cost-
responsible for?     
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Luck egalitarianism is essentially the view that it is unjust for an individual to be worse off than 
others due to no responsibility of her own.141 This principle, however, does not tell us much on the 
fate of the individual who is worse off due to her own responsibility. Suppose for instance smokers 
are responsible for smoking and a smoker gets lung cancer (partly) because of her smoking. Does 
the principle imply that society owes her absolutely no compensation for surgery expenses? Or is 
there more to the question, for instance because smoking is not the only cause of her lung cancer? 
In other words: The luck egalitarian literature offers many sophisticated discussions on how to 
understand the notion of responsibility, choice or option luck, and thus when more precisely it is 
(or is not) unjust for an individual to be worse off than others. But it does not offer any answer to 
the question of what more precisely the self-responsible worse off individual ought to be held 
cost-responsible for? Luck egalitarianism needs to answer the question of what benefits, if any, 
society, or whoever it is that has a duty to bring about justice, owes to the individual who is worse 
off due to her own responsibility. In this article I will therefore discuss two parallel questions: 1) if 
an individual is worse off than others due to her own responsibility then what benefits, if any, 
does society have justice-based reasons to provide her? Call this question Alpha. But if there are 
benefits which society does not have justice-based reasons to provide her, in terms of e.g. 
coverage of surgery expenses, then who should cover them? Her? Or her and other individuals 
behaving in the same way, e.g. other smokers? Therefore: 2) if an individual is worse off than 
others due to her own responsibility, then what benefits, if any, does society have justice-based 
reasons to hold that individual (uniquely) cost-responsible for? Call this question Beta.    
The matter of personal responsibility for smoking is widely discussed, and smoking also seems to 
be a very good case of luck egalitarian illustration. I therefore frame my questions – Alpha and 
Beta – by applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health care, such that I (for reasons of clarity) 
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take access to health care to be our (luck) egalitarian currency. Towards the end of the article, 
however, I will adjust my findings to a more plausible currency, namely welfare.  
I will assume that there are behaviours, call them R-ways, which 1) lead to increased risks of 
diseases, and 2) are something individuals themselves are responsible for. I assume smoking, over-
eating, drinking etc. to be R-ways. I do not take a precise stand on what responsibility requires, 
though I minimally assume an epistemic notion, such that e.g. a smoker must know about the risks 
of smoking in order to be responsible for smoking. I will ignore what other reasons society may 
have to help out needy individuals, and only discuss what society has justice-based reasons to do. 
This includes that I ignore potential other societal reasons to hold individuals cost-responsible for 
certain behaviours, than them being responsible. We may namely do that for other reasons, for 
instance reasons of paternalism – that is to help individuals quit (or not to begin) smoking (if) for 
their own good. The underlying intuition I will follow is (initially) that it ceteris paribus is unfair for 
individuals who do not self-responsibly impose risks on their own health, by e.g. smoking, to bear 
the costs of those who do self-responsibly impose risks on their own health, by e.g. smoking. This 
intuition, however, will later be revised.  
Overview of the article 
In Health, Luck, and Justice Shlomi Segall works out a comprehensive attempt to justify luck 
egalitarianism applied to justice in health care under the assumption that individuals are 
responsible for behaviours leading to increased risks of diseases, such as smoking, drinking, over-
eating etc.142 He argues that even though we do have reasons, such as reasons of meeting basic 
needs, to provide health care to individuals who fall ill due to such behaviours, we do not have 
justice-based reasons to do so, and the costs related to these diseases can therefore fairly be 
passed on to the responsible individuals themselves. However, there is here a crucial question of 
just what these costs are. 
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Based on Segall’s arguments I first come up with a first suggestion to Alpha. This is roughly that for 
each health care needing individual, if there is an R-way, then what society has justice-based 
reasons to cover is the health care costs minus some percent, which corresponds to the R-ways’ 
causal influence on the individuals’ health condition. However, unless we are willing to accept that 
e.g. a blood clot is caused by just a short period of high fat food, this suggestion presupposes our 
ability to establish to which extent a disease is caused by a certain R-way. Second, I argue that this 
suggestion fails on grounds of justice: Even though an R-way evidently has some causal influence 
on an individuals’ health condition, it does not follow that the individual therefore burden the 
society in the relevant sense. I therefore come up with a second suggestion to Alpha, arguing that 
what are relevant to compare is the actual health care costs of an individual behaving in R-ways 
minus the counter-factual costs had she not behaved in any R-way. If the actual costs are higher 
than the counter-factual costs, then society does not have justice-based reasons to cover the 
difference. Having established Alpha, we need to answer Beta. I therefore third, borrow a 
distinction made by Segall between standard luck egalitarianism and all luck egalitarianism. The 
former is the view that if an individual is worse off than others due to her own responsibility, then 
justice does not require anything. Inspired by this view I come up with a first suggestion to Beta: 
For each individual, behaving in R-ways, if there are costs that society does not have justice-based 
reasons to cover, then these costs are also what society has justice-based reasons to hold that 
individual (uniquely) cost-responsible for. All luck egalitarianism, on the other hand, is the view 
that if an individual is worse off than others due to her own responsibility, then justice requires 
her (bad) option luck to be equalized between her and other individuals behaving in the same 
way. Inspired by this view I fourth object to standard luck egalitarianism and come up with a 
second suggestion to Beta: If the costs of the group of individuals sharing an R-way is higher than 
the same groups’ counter-factual costs had they not behaved in that R-way, then what society has 
justice-based reasons to hold each R-way-individual cost-responsible for is this cost-difference 
divided by the number of individuals in the R-way-group proportionally to consumption. Fifth, I 
give two objections to the all luck egalitarian view, one of which by showing that costs, according 
to this calculation, may be unjustly affected my morally arbitrary matters such as socio-economic 
circumstances. I therefore label a third luck egalitarian view on this matter – universal luck 
egalitarianism – and come up with a third suggestion to Alpha and Beta: What is relevant to 
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compare, for each individual, is the universalisation of that individuals’ exercise of R-ways. In order 
to know both what society has justice-based reasons to cover and what society has justice-based 
reasons to hold that individual cost-responsible for, we need to compare the costs if all individuals 
in society exercised the same R-ways, and to the same degree, as that individual, with the costs if 
all of the same individuals behaved in no R-ways. If the former costs are higher than the latter, 
then what society has justice-based reasons to hold the individual cost-responsible for is the 
difference divided by the number of individuals in the universalisation. Sixth, I adjust my findings 
to welfare as our luck egalitarian currency. Finally I conclude.           
The problem and the first suggestion to Alpha 
In applying luck egalitarianism to justice in health care Segall argues that if an individual gets a 
disease due to behaviours for which she herself is responsible, say smoking, then the costs related 
to the treatment of this disease can fairly be passed on to that individual herself. However, it is not 
obvious what the costs are. For instance, a study made by van Baal et al. shows that the ultimo 
lifetime health care costs are higher for non-smokers than for smokers.143 Letting himself be 
confronted with this finding, Segall states that:  
The justification for passing on the costs of treatment to the imprudent was based on 
the premise that they unnecessarily burden the health care system. 
(…) Or to put it differently, the luck egalitarian view of health care justifies imposing 
on patients the financial burden of their imprudent conduct.144 
According to Segall, it is therefore irrelevant if, as this study suggests, the health care costs of 
smokers are higher than the health care costs of non-smokers. Smoking leads to unnecessary 
burdens of the health care system. Thus, following this intuition, as long as there are individuals 
who are worse off due to some R-way, there is a cost that society does not have justice-based 
reasons to cover.  
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Segall does not give any precise answer to the question of what these costs are, but following his 
line of thoughts I will come up with a first suggestion to Alpha. To do that we first need an 
understanding of direct costs, DC:   
For each health care treatment of an instance of a disease, D, there is a direct cost, 
DC, which is the actual health care expenses brought about by treatment, care, 
administration etc. of D.   
But DC is not all we need to establish in order to determine Alpha. This is because it is not obvious 
that a certain R-way is the only event which brings a certain disease about. First, it seems obvious 
that only few diseases are bound causally to one single behaviour. A broken ankle due to a risky 
jump from a bridge may be one example. However, when it comes to smoking-related diseases it 
gets more complicated (and probably not less complicated when it comes to diseases related to 
over-eating). Even though smokers get various diseases earlier, and die earlier, than non-smokers, 
most individuals will sooner or later get cancer or heart-diseases, no matter if they smoke or not. 
We simply face a problem of determining to which extent a disease, D, is caused by an R-way. 
Suppose John has smoked 20 cigarettes a day since he turned 15 years. On his 60th year he gets hit 
by a blood clot. He reaches the hospital in time and gets an angioplasty operation. He lives on, but 
has to go to some routine-check, say 6 times a year, for the rest of his life. Now the direct health 
care costs of John’s disease seems rather unproblematic to add together. The problem is how to 
determine to which extent John’s blood clot is caused by smoking rather than unavoidable 
matters, such as ageing? I will discuss this, but first come up with a first suggestion to Alpha in a 
way that is compatible with Segall’s arguments. How much of John’s health care costs does society 
have justice-based reasons to cover?   
For any instance of a disease, D, there may be previous R-ways, which have had causal influence, 
CI, on the occurrence of D. Call this RCI. If there is no RCI on D, then RCI equals 0%. If RCI is the 
only cause of D, then RCI equals 100%. We can now establish a first suggestion to what it is that 
society has justice-based reasons to cover.     
First suggestion to Alpha: 
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For all diseases, D1-Dn, there is a cost which society has justice-based reasons to 
cover, X, and  
X= DC - (RCI * DC)  
Given that there are direct costs, DC, related to all health care we can for each D conclude that 
there is a cost, i.e. a positive amount of money, that society has justice-based reasons to cover, 
unless RCI is 100%.  
But as mentioned the problem with this suggestion is how more precisely to determine RCI. For 
most instances of heart diseases (and many cancer diseases) which smokers get, we have reasons 
to believe that smoking has had some causal influence. But which causal influence? What shall we 
tell John about the causal influence of his smoking on his blood clot? Here is one preliminary 
suggestion:  
John got the blood clot at the time T1. The causal influence of his smoking 
consumption is 100%, since had he not smoked, then he would, we may plausibly 
assume, not have had the blood clot at time T1, even though he may get it at any 
later time T2.  
Given the enormous evidence on smoking’s impact on heart diseases, this suggestion seems right 
in the sense that it is very unlikely that John would have got a blood clot exactly at time T1 had he 
not smoked. However, the suggestion corresponds to saying that for all diseases, D1-Dn, which an 
R-way has causal influence on, then if D1-Dn occurs to an individual behaving in R-way, then RCI is 
100%. But this seems wrong exactly because it is rather likely that had John not smoked, then he 
would have got a blood clot at some later time T2, and in all cases he would have got some disease 
at some later time T2. Moreover, the suggestion is insensitive to the number of cigarettes John is 
smoking:  
1) John smokes 20 cigarettes a day in 45 years. Then he gets a blood clot at time T1. Had he 
not smoked 20 cigarettes in 45 years, then he would get a blood clot at time T3.  
2) John smokes 20 cigarettes a day in 5 years. Then he gets a blood clot at time T2. Had he 
not smoked 20 cigarettes in 5 years, then he would get a blood clot at time T3.  
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Following this suggestion RCI lies constant at 100% in both cases, since in both cases John would 
most likely not have got the blood clot at neither time T1 nor T2 had he not smoked. Assuming 
that most of us have, at least shorter, periods in our lives where we eat slightly too much, exercise 
too little, or what have you, it seems that for quite a few of the disease we most likely will get 
there is an R-ways’ causal influence, RCI, such that we would not have got these diseases at the 
exact time we get them have we not behaved in R-ways. In principle, even a couple of days on 
heavy cholesterol food may cause your blood clot to set in when you e.g. are 67 years and 17 days 
rather than when you are 67 years and 18 days, ceteris paribus. Holding RCI constant at 100% in all 
such cases seems strange, and would most likely imply that the majority of all diseases in society 
would be caused by different R-ways – behaviours for which we, ex hypothesei, are responsible.145 
Is this plausible?  
Well, if we define a disease in time and if John smokes 20 cigarettes a day in 45 years, and if 
smoking speeds up the process of vein calcification, then it actually does seem plausible to say 
that smoking caused John’s blood clot; it caused the very blood clot he got at the very time T1.  
Consider a rock lying on the edge of a cliff. Geologists estimates that in 50 years the rock will fall 
down the valley due to natural pressure. However, next Sunday I go to the rock and push it down 
the valley. Would we not believe I caused the rock to fall down the valley? If so, then smoking 
caused John’s blood clot just as I caused the rock to fall down the valley.  
However, defining RCI in time would not only imply that society owes nothing in terms of justice-
based compensation to Thomas who gets a blood clot, but only smoked in two months during high 
school, but also that it cannot on justice-based ground distinguish Thomas from John who smoked 
20 cigarettes a day in 45 years.  
As a matter of justice I therefore take it that we need to qualify degrees of RCI, such that e.g. John 
smoking 20 cigarettes a day in 45 years equals a RCI at, say, 60%, whereas RCI in the case of 
Thomas, who smoked only in two months, equals something much lower. But I not only fail to see 
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an obvious way to do this, but will also argue that even if there is an otherwise plausible way to do 
it, then the suggestion fails on grounds of justice:    
Objection and second suggestion to Alpha 
Suppose society claims it does not have justice-based reasons to cover 60% of the surgery 
expenses of John’s blood clot, because 60% of it is caused by smoking. Then I believe there is a 
valid objection for John to raise:  
Yes, this is true, but had I not smoked, then I probably would still have got the 
disease just somewhat later. Even more likely, I would have got some disease at 
some point later. If I did not smoke, then I would most likely still cost something for 
the health care system. If the costs of my smoking-related disease(s) are lower than 
the costs of the disease(s) I would have got had I not smoked, then I do not burden 
the health care system all things considered. If the costs of my smoking-related 
disease(s) are higher than the costs of the disease(s) I would have got had I not 
smoked, then I will pay the difference.   
I take this to be a very strong reason to reject my first suggestion to Alpha. Why should there be 
some costs in John’s disease-pattern that society does not have justice-based reasons to cover, if 
his R-way(s) does not burden the health care system, all things considered?     
Recall the intuition I initially appealed to: it is ceteris paribus unfair for individuals who do not self-
responsibly impose risks on their own health, by e.g. smoking, to bear the costs of those who do 
self-responsibly impose risks on their own health, by e.g. smoking. I believe we should revise this 
intuition, and more precisely hold that it is ceteris paribus unjust for individuals who do not self-
responsibly impose risks on their own health to bear potential additional costs of those who do 
self-responsibly impose risks on their own health.  
Thus, what is relevant to compare is for each individual the difference between the actual costs 
related to diseases brought about, or partly brought about, by R-ways and the counter factual 
costs related to the diseases the individual would have got if she had not behaved in any R-ways. 
Therefore, from this revised intuition I provide a second suggestion to what it is that society has 
justice-based reasons to cover if individuals need health care due to R-ways, Alpha.   
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Second suggestion to Alpha: 
For each individual, I, behaving in R-ways, R1-Rn, there is a cost, which is DC of all 
diseases in I’s life. Call this X. 
For each individual, I, behaving in R-ways, R1-Rn, there would be a cost, which is DC of 
all diseases in I’s life, had I behaved in no R-ways. Call this Y. 
For each individual, I, behaving in R-ways, society has justice-based reasons to cover 
X if X ≤ Y. If X > Y, then society has justice-based reasons to cover X ÷ (X÷Y).      
Clarification: Y refers to the sum of health care costs of I’s life in the nearest possible world where 
I behaves in no R-ways. If in the actual world an individual smokes, then our relevant possible 
world is the nearest possible world where I does not smoke, nor behaves in any other R-ways. If in 
the actual world I smokes and over-eats, then our relevant possible world is the nearest possible 
world where I does not smoke, nor over-eats, nor behaves in any other R-ways (if, for each I there 
are 2 or more equally near possible worlds where this requirement is satisfied, then Y refers to the 
average health care costs of I’s lives in these worlds).146     
Standard luck-egalitarianism and the first suggestion to Beta 
Thus, having determined Alpha we need second to know what society has justice-based reasons to 
hold the individual (uniquely) cost-responsible for, that is question Beta.  
In the luck egalitarian literature there is a thorough discussion on whether society ought to 
neutralize 1) only brute luck, or 2) brute luck as well as option luck, such that justice requires 
individuals who take the same choices to risk pool with one another. Segall has labelled these 
positions standard luck egalitarianism and all luck egalitarianism, respectively. According to the 
former, a position which Segall defends himself, if an individual gets sick due to some R-way, his 
fate is simply beyond the scope of justice (justice does not require anything).147 According to the 
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latter, justice requires individuals sharing the same R-way to risk pool with one another.148 More 
precisely, the difference between the two is the following: if two individuals are worse off, but 
unequally worse off, due to the same behaviour, for which they are responsible, then standard 
luck egalitarianism is silent in this inequality, while justice, according to all luck egalitarianism, 
requires their bad (option) luck to be equalized. I will suggest an answer to Beta based on each of 
these versions of luck egalitarianism. I will argue that the latter version is more plausible than the 
former, but ultimately suggest a third version, which I will label universal luck egalitarianism.  
If my second suggestion to Alpha is correct, and we follow the intuition from standard luck 
egalitarianism, then the answer to Beta is straightforwardly the following149:    
First suggestion to Beta: 
What society has justice-based reasons to hold each individual, I, behaving in R-ways, 
cost-responsible for is:  
If X ≤ Y, then 0  
If X > Y, then X ÷ Y  
Thus, what society for each individual, I, does not have justice-based reasons to cover is also what 
it has justice-based reasons to hold I (uniquely) cost-responsible for. An objection to this proposal, 
however, is obvious: Imagine John and Brian, each smoking 20 cigarettes a day in 45 years. In the 
age of 60 they both get lung cancer with which they struggle in and out of the hospital in three 
years at a rather high cost. After the three years they both die and their lives have had the same 
rather high lifetime health care costs, say 100 at some price-index. Actual costs:  
John: 100 
Brian: 100 
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However, had neither John nor Brian smoked, then their lives would have went on very differently. 
John would have been hit by a truck some few years later, smashed completely with no hope for 
survival, and his lifetime health care costs would therefore only account for some few vaccine 
meetings with his doctor, and his death certificate. His counter-factual lifetime health care costs 
are therefore very small, say 5. Brian, on the other hand, would have got colon cancer 5 years later 
with which he would struggle in and out the hospital for some years at a rather high price. Then he 
would die with lifetime health care costs at 100. Counter-factual costs are therefore:  
John: 5 
Brian: 100 
My first suggestion to Beta implies the following regarding respectively John and Brian’s cost-
responsibility:  
John: 100 ÷ 5 = 95 
Brian: 100 ÷ 100 = 0 
John and Brian behave (responsibly) in the exact same way and burden the society to the exact 
same degree (ceteris paribus), and yet they are held differently cost-responsible. Is this counter-
intuitive? At first glance it seems so. What they counter-factually would cost for the health care 
system if they did not smoke (or performed in any other R-way) seems indeed to be a matter of 
brute luck – something completely out of their control. Why should John be held more cost-
responsible than Brian simply because he, if he did not smoke, would have been hit by a truck and 
therefore counter-factually only would have brought about low health care costs for the society to 
cover? Following the intuition from standard luck egalitarianism there may be a reason:  
What an individual would cost health care-wise if she behaved in no R-ways is a 
matter of brute luck. However, this only becomes an issue if the individual chooses to 
behave in R-ways. If John’s actual/counter-factual cost difference is higher than 
Brian’s, it is therefore a matter of bad option luck. By choosing to smoke, John 
himself brings about the relevance of his counter-factual health care costs. By 
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choosing to smoke John and Brian simply brings themselves beyond the scope of 
justice.150  
However, why should we accept that this is all justice requires? The appealing idea about luck 
egalitarianism is that luck is morally arbitrary. Choices however are not. What justice requires is 
therefore to make sure that equal choices result in equal outcomes. It may be unfair for the rest of 
the society to bear potential additional costs of smokers’ self-imposed diseases, and John may 
therefore not have a valid complaint against society, if his lifetime health care costs are higher, 
than if he did not smoke. This, however, does not exclude him from having a fair complaint against 
Brian, with whom he in all morally relevant aspects, i.e. choices, is completely identical. He may 
say to Brian: ‘we smoke the same and therefore we pay the same – as what regards you and me, 
the difference between us is a matter of only brute luck’.151 
All luck egalitarianism and the second suggestion to Beta 
I fail to see why justice should not require John and Brian to risk pool with one another, but it is 
beyond the scope of this article to fully establish why. If I am wrong, then my first suggestion to 
Beta seems to be the answer, if any, to the question of what society has justice-based reasons to 
hold the individual (uniquely) cost-responsible for. However, if I am right then in order to know 
what society has justice-based reasons to hold the individual cost-responsible for, we need first to 
define the cost of a group sharing an R-way. That is:       
For each group of individuals, I1-Im, behaving in an R-way, R1, there is a cost, which is 
DC of all diseases in the lives of I1-Im. Call this X. 
For each group of individuals, I1-Im, behaving in an R-way, R1, there would be a cost, 
which is DC of all diseases in the lives of I1-Im, had I1-Im not behaved in R1-way. Call 
this Y. 
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The cost of group I1-Im(R1) is ZG, and ZG = X ÷ Y. 
Two remarks of clarification: First, Y refers to the nearest possible world where each member of 
the group of smokers does not smoke, but behaves in the same other R-ways, if any, as in the 
actual world. This is important since different R-way groups plausibly overlap in the actual world. If 
there e.g. is an overlap between smokers and alcoholic drinkers, then the drinkers’ eventual 
additional costs is to be accounted by the group of drinkers. Therefore, if we measure the cost of 
smoking, we need to hold all other R-ways constant on our counter-factual comparison. Second, if 
R1 is smoking, then I take it that all individuals who smoke belong to the same group. Contrary, we 
could suggest that individuals who smoke e.g. 10 cigarettes a day are one group, while individuals 
who smoke 15 cigarettes a day are another group, etc. Such division could go very long, such that 
individuals, who in their entire life smoke exactly 292001 cigarettes, constitute one group. It would 
be a pure coincidence if we could even par two smokers into one group. In order for all luck 
egalitarianism to make sense, we need general R-way types, such that e.g. smokers constitutes 
one R-way group, I1-Im(R1), and alcoholic drinkers another R-way group, I1-Il(R2), etc. Having said 
this, I take it that we would want to make our suggestion to Beta sensitive to different degrees of 
different R-ways, such that we divide ZG into its’ lowest Behavioural Entity (e.g. grams of tobacco 
smoked). Call this BE. In order to determine what society has justice-based reasons to hold each 
individual behaving in different R-ways cost-responsible for, we simply divide the group cost, ZG, of 
each R-way by the number of lowest behavioural entity, BE, that is performed in the group, which 
we multiply by the number of BE that the individual has performed. We continue to do this 
equation for each of the R-ways the individual behaves in and add the numbers together. Based 
on the cost of each R-way-group I thus suggest what society has justice-based reasons to hold 
each R-way-individual cost-responsible for: 
Second suggestion to Beta: 
{[ZG(R1)/BE(R1)] * I(BE(R1))} + {[ZG(R2)/BE(R2)] * I(BE(R2))} + {[ZG(Rn)/BE(Rn)] * I(BE(Rn))} 
= ZI 
What society has justice-based reasons to hold the individual(R1-Rn) cost-responsible 
for is: 
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If ZI ≤ 0, then 0 
If ZI > 0, then ZI 
Clarification: The suggestion accounts for individuals behaving in more than one R-way. It answers 
what an individual should be held cost-responsible for if she e.g. smokes, over-eats and drinks by 
adding together her proportional share of first the cost of smokers, second the cost of over-eaters, 
and third the group of drinkers. It is worth stressing that if the cost of one or more of these R-way-
groups are negative, then it counts in her advantage, since then would also her proportional share 
be negative. This, however, only works until the point where ZI is 0. It may be suggested that if an 
individual chooses some R-ways that generally leads to lower costs, such that ZI is lower than 0, 
then she should have some cash benefit corresponding to the savings up to 0. This, however, is a 
mistake since it would make her better off than others in terms of our egalitarian currency, which 
here is access to health care. The reason for such intuition, I believe, is simply that when having 
this discussion we assume access to health care to be our distributive currency. But we only do 
that for reasons of clarity, not because it is a plausible currency, all things considered.  
Furthermore: My second suggestion to Beta does not mean to imply that more of a given R-way, 
say smoking, equals more or less additional costs. In fact, I doubt that there is any linear 
connection here. Rather, the point is that if some R-way leads to additional health care costs, then 
according to my revised initial intuition, it is unjust for the rest of society to cover these additional 
costs. To distribute eventual additional costs of an R-way among the R-way group-members 
proportionally to consumption seems fair, since individuals’ proportional consumption 
corresponds to the only thing that (here) is morally relevant, namely individuals’ exercise of that 
R-way.        
Given the possibility of two smokers having very different counter-factual lifetime health care 
cost, I believe my second suggestion to Beta is an improvement, justice-wise, since smokers here 
split their actual/counter-factual cost difference proportionally to their respective consumption. 
However, this does not mean there is no room for further improvements. Rather, I now present 
two objections to my second suggestion to Beta before I suggest my idea of universal luck 
egalitarianism, which involves a third suggestion to both Alpha and Beta.   
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2 objections to the second suggestion to Beta 
I have at least two worries about all luck egalitarianism and my second suggestion to Beta. First, 
we should note that it is a contingent and morally arbitrary matter how many fellows, if any, a 
smoker has to risk pool with. What if there is only one smoker in society? Then inevitably my 
second suggestion to Beta collapses into my first suggestion to Beta, and all luck egalitarianism 
collapses into standard luck egalitarianism.152 I believe it is fragile to have a principle of distributive 
justice to rely on such a contingent matter.     
Second, recall my revised initial intuition: It is unjust for individuals who do not self-responsibly 
impose risks on their own health to bear potential additional costs of those who do self-
responsibly impose risks on their own health. If this is so, then what we are looking for when 
establishing answers to Alpha and Beta is additional costs brought about by smoking. We are 
simply looking for a causal connection between additional costs and smoking. But calculations, 
according to my second suggestion to Beta, may be affected by morally arbitrary matters. For 
example, smokers may be more (or less) expensive than non-smokers, but for reasons that has 
nothing to do with smoking. Therefore, here is my second objection to all luck egalitarianism: 
Suppose a society consists of two groups, A and B. A constitute the upper half of the 
socio-economic scale, and B constitute the lower half of the socio-economic scale. 
20% of the population smokes, but 80% of the smokers belong to group B. The 
society faces the following average health care cost-levels: 
Non-smokers actual health care costs: 100  
Smokers’ actual health care costs: 120 
     Smokers’ counter-factual (non-smoking) health care costs: 90 
Again, the point is that smokers’ counter-factual costs, and their actual costs, may be higher (or 
lower) than the costs of non-smokers, but for reasons that has nothing to do with smoking. We 
simply know from social epidemiology that individuals in lower social groups have higher risks of 
various diseases than individuals in higher social groups even when adjusted for smoking and 
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other well-known behavioural risk-factors.153 Under the plausible assumption that socio-economic 
status is not an R-way, this is a problem for my second suggestion to Beta and the all luck 
egalitarian view. The group of smokers seems to have a fair complaint when objecting if for 
instance their counter-factual baseline is lower than the actual baseline of the group of non-
smokers. This would namely mean that smokers are held cost-responsible for more than they are 
responsible for. For each single smoker it seems indeed to be a morally arbitrary matter whether 
her fellow smokers belong to lower or higher socio-economic groups, but that matter may 
plausibly affect her cost-responsibility.154 
Universal luck egalitarianism and the third suggestion to Alpha and Beta 
The two worries should not make us go back to standard luck egalitarianism. After all these 
worries change nothing about the unfairness between John and Brian who smoke the exact same 
number of cigarettes and yet end up being held very differently cost-responsible. The reason why 
this is unfair is that their counter-factual costs may be differently affected by morally arbitrary 
circumstances. But if this is so, then it also seems morally arbitrary and thus unfair if different R-
way groups, say the group of smokers and the group of ski tourists, are affected differently by 
morally arbitrary circumstances, such as socio-economic status. According to our very luck 
egalitarian principle it is unjust for an individual to be worse off than others due to no 
responsibility of her own. Again, I assume socio-economic status not to be an R-way, but even if it 
is then it would indeed be weird to suggest that it is an R-way how many fellows an R-way 
individual has to risk pool with. I therefore suggest a principle of universal luck egalitarianism, 
which can account for these worries. When answering Alpha and Beta, affections from morally 
arbitrary matters ought to be as small as possible. Ideally, for each individual the only thing that is 
morally relevant is that individuals’ exercise of R-ways, and therefore that, and only that, is what 
Alpha and Beta ideally should account for. Universal luck egalitarianism therefore involves a 
revision of both Alpha and Beta.    
                                                          
153
 Marmot, M; Status Syndrome; London; Bloomsbury; 2004. 
154
 Neither the study of van Baal et al. nor a slightly earlier Danish study on the cost of respectively smokers and non-smokers, 
adjust for socio-economic status.  Rasmussen, SR. et al.; “The total lifetime health cost savings of smoking cessation to society”; 
European Journal of Public Health; 2005; 15; 6; p. 601–606. In some societies we may also imagine such morally arbitrary affections 
from differences in genetics. 
Health, personal responsibility, and distributive justice. PhD dissertation. Martin Marchman Andersen. 
101 
 
Third suggestion to Alpha:  
For each individual, I, behaving in R-ways, R1-Rn, there is a cost:  
X = DC of all diseases in I’s life.  
And there are two universalized costs, Y and Z: 
Y = DC of the lives of all individuals in society, had they all behaved in the very same 
R-ways to the very same degree as I. 
Z = DC of the lives of all individuals in society, had they all behaved in no R-ways. 
Furthermore: 
M = the number of individuals in society. 
What society for each I, behaving in R-ways, has justice-based reasons to cover is: 
If Y ≤ Z, then X 
If Y > Z, then X ÷ [(Y÷Z)/M]             
Clarification: If an individual smokes 10 cigarettes a day in 15 years, and behaves in no other R-
ways, then Y refers to DC of all individuals in the society in the nearest possible world where they 
all smoke exactly 10 cigarettes a day in 15 years and behave in no other R-ways. Z refers to DC of 
the same individuals in the nearest possible world where they all behave in no R-ways. If Y is lower 
than or equal to Z, then the universalisation of the individuals’ R-ways should not be taken as a 
burden on the health care system, and society therefore has justice-based reasons to cover X, 
even though some diseases are brought about or partly brought about by R-ways. If Y is higher 
than Z, then society has justice-based reasons to cover X ÷ (Y ÷ Z) divided by the number of 
individuals that are part of the universalisation, M. Beta follows straightforwardly from Alpha:      
Third suggestion to Beta:  
What society has justice-based reasons to hold each worse off individual, I, behaving 
in R-ways, cost-responsible for is:   
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If Y ≤ Z, then 0 
If Y > Z, then (Y÷Z)/M             
I believe this third suggestion to Alpha and Beta is an improvement, justice-wise, compared to the 
former suggestions. Having the entire society represented in each baseline gives the benefit of 
large numbers, such that morally arbitrary affections will be highly reduced. The comparison is 
thus between the universalisation of the very R-ways the individual behaves in and the 
universalisation of prudence, which is the possible world where no individuals behave in any R-
ways. The only difference between the two worlds is thus the very R-ways the individual behaves 
in – and that is the only thing that (here) is morally relevant. If the R-ways of an individual 
generally leads to higher costs than the world of prudence, then the individual will be held cost-
responsible for her proportional share of these R-ways. As I generally have framed my questions in 
a societal context I also hold the society to by our moral scope. The suggestion, however, is 
straightforwardly expandable to a larger moral scope, such as the entire world.  
From health to welfare 
So far I have only focused on health care costs. However, a (luck) egalitarian discussion goes on 
what more precisely individuals ought to have equal shares off, whether or not adjusted for 
responsibility. Since even complete equality in access to health care is compatible with huge 
inequalities in resources or welfare, only few, if any, would probably argue that (opportunity for) 
health is that, and that only, which people should be equal in terms of. Unless we hold that health 
(care) is a separate sphere, it seems that the principles we find when examining justice in health 
care need ultimately to be translatable to a more plausible currency. Many luck egalitarians’ 
answer to the equality of what-question is welfare. If so then our principle dictates that it is unjust 
for an individual to be worse off welfare-wise than others through no responsibility of her own. If 
an individual then is worse off welfare-wise due to her own responsibility, then we need to know 
what welfare-level justice requires her to have, Alpha. 
Suppose Jim and Bob are equally well off welfare-wise at some time T1:  
T1   Jim=100w  Bob=100w 
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T2 Bob behaves in some R-way and as a consequence his welfare drops to 
50:  
  Jim=100w  Bob=50w 
Then what welfare-level does justice require Bob to have? Initially we may tend to think 50, since 
the welfare drop is brought about by something for which he himself is responsible. But I think this 
is a mistake, and I think my arguments from the health care case illustrate why. Bob can simply say 
‘yes, it is true in one very narrow sense of causality, that my R-way, for which I am responsible, 
brought about my welfare loss of 50, but had I not behaved in R-way, then it is some uncertain 
assumption that my welfare-level would just have remained at 100’. Suppose therefore:  
T2 (counter-factually):  Had Bob not acted in R-way, some event would have occurred, which 
Bob himself is not responsible for, and brought his welfare-level down 
to 80.  
  Jim=100w  Bob=80w 
Following my second suggestion to Alpha, what society has justice-based reasons to cover is Bob’s 
welfare loss when R-way minus the difference between his welfare loss and his (potential) 
counter-factual welfare loss if he behaved in no R-way. In this case it would be 50 ÷ (50 ÷ 20). 
Thus, society, according to my second suggestion to Alpha, has justice-based reasons to 
compensate Bob for 20 welfare-units; it has justice-based reasons to bring Bob up to a welfare-
level of 70. However, both Bob’s actual and his counter-factual welfare-loss may be affected by 
morally arbitrary matters. Suppose the reason for Bob’s welfare-loss is that he smoked one and 
only one cannabis joint, which accidently brought him a cannabis psychosis. But had all individuals 
in society smoked one and only one cannabis joint then the average welfare-loss, if any, would be 
much lower. That Bob tracks a psychosis due to one joint is simply just very bad luck. Following my 
third suggestion to Alpha and Beta I therefore propose the first baseline to be the universalisation 
of Bob’s R-way(s) and the second baseline to be the universalisation of no R-ways.  
Fourth suggestion to Alpha and Beta (welfare): 
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For each worse off individual, I, behaving in R-ways, R1-Rn, there are two 
universalized average welfare-levels, Y and Z: 
Y = the average welfare level of all individuals in society, had they all behaved in the 
very same R-ways to the very same degree as I. 
Z = the average welfare level of all individuals in society, had they all behaved in no 
R-ways.  
If Y ≥ Z, then society has justice-based reasons to bring I up to the actual average 
welfare-level. 
If Y ≤ Z, then society has justice-based reasons to bring I up to the actual average 
welfare-level minus (Z ÷ Y).155  
I take it that our currency is welfare over life, but do not think there is anything I have proposed 
that makes my suggestion incompatible with other views on the equality-when-question.   
Conclusion and final remarks 
In this article I have suggested different luck egalitarian answers to (Alpha) the question of what is 
it, if anything, that society has justice-based reasons to compensate individuals for, if they are 
worse off than others due to their own responsibility, and (Beta) the question of what is it, if 
anything, that society has justice-based reasons to hold individuals (uniquely) cost-responsible for, 
if they are worse off due to their own responsibility.  
I have argued that it is difficult to estimate different R-ways’ causal influence on a disease, but, 
moreover, that it fail on grounds of justice to claim that there for each disease, which an R-way 
                                                          
155
 A problem for the luck egalitarian concerns the question of worse off than whom? If luck egalitarianism holds that it is unjust for 
an individual to be worse off than others due to no responsibility of her own, then we need know more precisely what ‘others’ 
refers to. Is it 1) the best off person? 2) the average? Or 3) the average in the counter-factual society where no one acts in any R-
way? If 1 or 2, then it seems that the worse off person who does not behave in any R-way, has a fair complaint, if she argues that it 
is unfair that the baseline is affected by R-ways. If other individuals did not smoke, drink, drunk-drive etc. then the average welfare 
level, to which the worse off individual’s position should be compared, may be much higher. Why should the prudent worse off 
individual suffer from the R-way individuals’ imprudent choices?   
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has had causal influence on, necessarily is a cost that society does not have justice-based reasons 
to cover. It is simply unjustifiable to hold individuals cost-responsible, if there is in fact no cost, all 
things considered. And the most plausible way to determine the cost of an R-way is to compare 
its’ actual cost to the counter-factual cost if this R-way did not occur. This is the underlining 
principle we ought to apply when answering Alpha and Beta.         
Having said this, it is not clear how to distribute eventual costs that society does not have justice-
based reasons to cover. I have given three suggestions. First, standard luck egalitarianism does not 
require anything, if an individual is worse off due to her own responsibility. If this is so, then the 
obvious answer seems to be that for each individual, if there is something society does not have 
justice-based reasons to cover then this is also what society has justice-based reasons to hold that 
individual (uniquely) cost-responsible for. However, two individuals may have very different 
counter-factual health care costs, and counter-factual costs are defined to be costs if no R-ways at 
all. The answer therefore implies that two individuals can be held very differently cost-responsible 
even if they behave in the very same way. This is counter-intuitive, or so I maintain. Therefore, 
second, all-luck egalitarianism requires option luck between individuals behaving in identical R-
ways to be equalized. I have argued that this view needs general R-way types, but can be, and 
ought to be, made sensitive to degrees of a certain R-way, e.g. different amounts of smoked 
cigarettes. While I regard the all-luck view to be an improvement, justice-wise, I have also objected 
to it since also R-way groups may be held differently cost-responsible for reasons that has nothing 
to do with the R-way in question – i.e. morally arbitrary matters. Therefore, third, I have suggested 
universal luck egalitarianism: In order to determine what society for each R-way individual has 
justice-based reasons to cover and what it has justice-based reason to hold that individuals cost-
responsible for, we should compare the health care costs of the universalisation of that 
individuals’ R-way(s) to the health care costs of the universalisation of no R-ways. If the former is 
higher than the latter, then what society does not have justice-based reasons to cover and to hold 
that individual cost-responsible for is the difference divided by the number of individuals that are 
part of the universalisation. Finally I have shown what universal luck egalitarianism implies if our 
currency is welfare. 
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Given the objections I have raised towards standard luck- and all luck egalitarianism I believe 
universal luck egalitarianism, as I have proposed it, provide us with the most plausible answer to 
Alpha and Beta. These answers thus provide a model as for what justice requires if individuals are 
worse of than others due to their own responsibility. The model is silent on what more precisely 
responsibility requires and can be filled out with different notions of responsibility that one wish 
to defend, such as free will, reason-responsiveness, or true identity.156 It is also compatible with a 
notion of different degrees of responsibility simply by changing the R-way from being a constant 
to being a variable, such that if there is something the R-way individual is (e.g.) only half 
responsible for, then her eventual cost-responsibility should be multiplied by 0,5.157  
Finally, given the use of possible worlds it may be objected to my suggestion that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to comply with. But as the questions I discuss regards what justice requires, such 
objection is beside the point. First we need to know what justice requires then we can do the 
actual calculations, which may imply that we must settle with inaccurate numbers.  
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 See respectively Kane, R; “Free Will: New Directions for an Ancient Problem”; in Fischer, JM (eds.); Free Will: Critical Concepts in 
Philosophy. Volume III: Libertarianism, Alternative Possibilities, and Moral Responsibility; New York; Routledge; 2005. And: Fischer, 
JM, Ravizza, M; Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility; Cambridge University Press; 1998. And: Frankfurt, HG; 
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 See Roemer, J; “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner”; Philosophy and Public Affairs; 1993; 22; 2; p. 
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This PhD dissertation is a contribution to discussions about personal responsibility in relation to distributive justice in 
health and health care. It is a contribution to contemporary political philosophy in general, but in particular to luck 
egalitarian theory. I aim to answer three focal questions: 1) What role ought personal responsibility to play in 
distributive justice in health and health care? 2) What does it take for an individual to be responsible for her own 
health condition (or responsible in general)? And 3) what is the relation between responsibility and cost-
responsibility? It consists in four articles, but I also offer, first, an introduction, second, a section on different 
efficiency-based political reasons to hold individuals cost-responsible for behaviours that leads to increased risks of 
diseases, and third, a section on the methodology I use. In my first article I bring recent political philosophical 
discussions of responsibility in egalitarian and luck egalitarian theory to bear on issues of social inequality in health, 
and access to health care. I argue that distributive justice in health and health care should be sensitive to 
responsibility, but also that individuals at the most fundamental level never are responsible in such a way that appeals 
to individuals’ own responsibility can justify inequality. This explains why we should give free and equal health care 
access – also to individuals affected by diseases for which lifestyle choices are a risk factor. It also explains why we 
have justice-based reasons to reduce social inequality in health. In my second article I investigate and (partly) object to 
a suggestion put forward by Shlomi Segall, according to which we should exchange the notion of responsibility with a 
notion of Reasonable Avoidability in the luck egalitarian theory. I argue that the size of the health-care costs related to 
smoking and obesity is relevant for whether society reasonably can expect individuals to avoid smoking and obesity. In 
my third article I ask what it fundamentally takes for an individual to be responsible for overweight or obesity. I 
examine what (in philosophy) appear to be the three basic approaches to responsibility. To illustrate the implications 
of each of them I introduce a made-up obese test person, who eats too many high fat cakes, and I show what it takes, 
according to each of these theories, for her to be responsible for her obesity. I show that only one of these 
approaches can justify the widespread intuition that much causal influence on obesity, such as genetics and social 
circumstances, diminishes, or completely undermines, personal responsibility. This approach, however, most likely 
implies that personal responsibility is generally impossible. I argue, nonetheless, that this approach is plausible. In my 
fourth and final article I proceed under the assumption that responsibility is possible. I examine the relation between 
responsibility (for one’s own health condition) and cost-responsibility (for health care expenses). This involves a 
discussion of what it plausibly means to burden the health care system, since, as I argue, if there is no burden then 
there is no justice-based reason for cost-responsibility, even if there is responsibility. I argue that we should 
understand the burden by comparing actual responsibility-tracking costs and counter-factual (nearest possible world) 
non-responsibility-tracking costs. 




Denne Ph.d.-afhandling er et bidrag til diskussioner om personligt ansvar i relation til fordelingsretfærdighed i 
sundhed og sygdomsbehandling. Den er et bidrag til politisk filosofi i almindelighed, men i særdeleshed til luck 
egalitaristisk teori. Jeg besvarer følgende tre spørgsmål: 1) Hvilken rolle bør personligt ansvar spille i relation til 
fordelingsretfærdighed i sundhed og sygdomsbehandling? 2) Er individer selv ansvarlige for deres egen 
sundhedstilstand? Og 3) hvis individer selv er ansvarlige for deres egen sundhedstilstand, hvilke implikationer har 
dette så i forhold til deres omkostningsansvar? Afhandlingen består af fire artikler, men jeg tilbyder først en general 
introduktion, et afsnit om forskellige effektivitets-baserede grunde til at holde individer omkostningsansvarlige for 
adfærd, som leder til øget risiko for sygdomme, og et afsnit om den metode jeg anvender. I min første artikel 
anvender jeg de seneste diskussioner om ansvar i politisk filosofi på emner vedrørende social ulighed i sundhed, og 
adgang til sygdomsbehandling. Jeg argumenterer for, at fordelingsretfærdighed i sundhed og sygdomsbehandling bør 
være sensitiv til ansvar, men også, at individer, på det mest fundamentale niveau, aldrig er ansvarlige på en sådan 
måde, at appeller til individers eget ansvar kan retfærdiggøre ulighed. Dette forklarer hvorfor vi skal give lige adgang 
til sygdomsbehandling – også til individer som er syge, som følge af (blandt andet) valg af livsstil. Det forklarer også, 
hvorfor vi har retfærdighedsbaserede grunde til at reducere social ulighed i sundhed. I min anden artikel undersøger 
jeg, og (delvist) argumenterer imod, et forslag fremsat af Shlomi Segall, om at bytte ideen om ansvar ud med en ide 
om rimelig undgålighed i luck egalitaristisk teori. Jeg argumenterer også for, at størrelsen af sundhedsudgifter, som er 
relateret til rygning og fedme, er relevant i forhold til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt samfundet med rimelighed kan 
forvente, at individer undgår rygning og fedme. I min tredje artikel spørger jeg til, hvad det fundamentalt set kræver, 
for at et individ er ansvarligt for sin egen overvægt eller fedme. Jeg undersøger filosofiens tre grundlæggende tilgange 
til spørgsmålet om ansvar. For at illustrere implikationerne af hver af disse, introducerer jeg en (kunstig) test-person, 
som spiser for mange fedtholdige kager, og jeg viser, hvad hver af disse tilgange til ansvar kræver, for at denne person 
er ansvarlig for overvægt og fedme. Kun en af disse tilgange kan imidlertid retfærdiggøre den meget udbredte 
intuition, at kausal indflydelse på overvægt og fedme, såsom genetiske dispositioner og sociale omstændigheder, 
reducerer eller underminerer personligt ansvar. Men denne tilgang til ansvar leder, med meget stor sandsynlighed, til 
den konklusion, at personligt ansvar, helt generelt, er en umulighed. Ikke desto mindre argumenterer jeg for, at denne 
tilgang er plausibel. Jeg fortsætter dog under den antagelse, at ansvar er muligt, og tilbyder en fjerde artikel om 
forholdet mellem ansvar (for egen sundhed) og omkostningsansvar (for omkostninger til sygdomsbehandling). Jeg 
diskuterer, hvad det vil sige at være en (økonomisk) byrde for sundhedssystemet, fordi, som jeg argumenterer for, 
hvis et individ ikke er nogen økonomisk byrde, så er der heller ikke retfærdigheds-baserede grunde til at holde det 
omkostningsansvarligt, uanset om det, det er ansvarligt for, på triviel vis, medfører omkostninger. Jeg argumenterer 
for, at vi skal forstå ideen om en byrde ved at sammenligne aktuelle omkostninger, som er ansvarspådragende, med 
kontra-faktiske omkostninger, som ikke er ansvarspådragende.   
 
 
 
